Death Penalty Prosecutorial Charging Decisions and County Budgetary Restrictions:  Is the Death Penalty Arbitrarily Applied Based on County Funding? by Rupp, Ashley
Fordham Law Review 
Volume 71 Issue 6 Article 9 
2003 
Death Penalty Prosecutorial Charging Decisions and County 
Budgetary Restrictions: Is the Death Penalty Arbitrarily Applied 
Based on County Funding? 
Ashley Rupp 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Ashley Rupp, Death Penalty Prosecutorial Charging Decisions and County Budgetary Restrictions: Is the 
Death Penalty Arbitrarily Applied Based on County Funding?, 71 Fordham L. Rev. 2735 (2003). 
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol71/iss6/9 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and 
History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Fordham Law Review by an authorized editor of FLASH: The Fordham 
Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information, please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu. 
DEATH PENALTY PROSECUTORIAL
CHARGING DECISIONS AND COUNTY
BUDGETARY RESTRICTIONS: IS THE DEATH




There's not a lot of money there, but still we're a can-do county.'
Last summer, Gregory McKnight faced death penalty charges in
front of Judge Simmons in the Vinton County, Ohio, courthouse.2
Like many death penalty cases, the facts alleged against McKnight
evidenced a heinous crime.' McKnight stood accused of the murders
of two local people whose remains were found in his home during an
unrelated police search for stolen firearms.4 Typical of many small
counties with limited death penalty experience, Vinton County had
not adequately budgeted for the unexpected and enormous costs a
death penalty trial posed. Typical of many defendants facing the
death penalty, McKnight's due process rights were at risk because
shortage of county funds meant that the county could not afford to
provide him with an adequate defense.' Atypical of any criminal
* J.D. Candidate, 2004, Fordham University School of Law. I am always grateful to
my family and friends for their support, especially my parents, Michael and Lorraine
Rupp, and my brother and sister-in-law, David and Susan Burgess, for giving me a
lifetime of inspiration in my niece, Lillian. Thank you to Professor Deborah Denno
for her suggestions and comments throughout this process. Finally, thank you to all
those working so hard for so little to provide badly needed representation to indigent
defendants accused of capital crimes.
1. Adam Liptak, Citing Cost, Judge Rejects Death Penalty, N.Y. Times, Aug. 18,
2002, at A18 (quoting Michael M. Bledsoe, Vinton County, Ohio Board of
Commissioners President). The actual opinion in the case of State v. McKnight is
currently unpublished.
2. See id. Vinton County, Ohio is the least populated county in Ohio, situated
approximately two hours southeast from Columbus, Ohio.
3. Id.
4. See Michael Sangiacomo, On the Wings of a Dove, Plain Dealer (Cleveland),
Jan. 19, 2003 (Sunday magazine) [hereinafter Sangiacomo, Wings].
5. See Liptak, supra note 1. For costs of the death penalty, see infra Part II.
6. See Liptak, supra note 1.
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proceeding was the trial judge's recognition of this risk.7 In a shocking
and unprecedented decision, Judge Simmons denied the prosecution's
application to pursue the death penalty against McKnight. The judge
decided that the county lacked the funding necessary to guarantee
McKnight's right to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment.'
Because, as Judge Simmons acknowledged, "death is different,"9 and
therefore subject to a higher degree of due process, a capital case
would require more resources than a non-capital trial. Thus, a capital
case would strain the county budget so far as to put McKnight's due
process rights at risk."'
Like many states, Ohio requires two court-appointed defense
lawyers in death penalty trials.'' Further, Ohio's death penalty trials
are bifurcated, consisting of a guilt phase and a penalty phase. 2 These
procedural safeguards make it more costly to prosecute and defend a
death penalty trial than a non-capital trial."3 Because Vinton County
had an annual budget of only $2.7 million and the estimated costs just
to defend McKnight in his death penalty trial were $350,000, Judge
Simmons decided that the fiscal impact on the county would be too
great to ensure an adequate defense. 4 The Ohio Court of Appeals for
Vinton County dismissed the prosecution's appeal, allowing Judge
Simmons' ruling to stand.1 5
After much political and community pressure,'" however, Judge
Simmons reversed himself and allowed the prosecution to pursue its
death penalty case against McKnight. 7 In reversing himself, Judge
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. ld.; see also Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 188 (1976). For a complete
discussion of Gregg and due process requirements for death penalty cases, see infra
Part It.
10. See Liptak, supra note 1.
11. Id.
12. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2929.03(C)(2)(b), (D) (Anderson 2002) (requiring
that the same triers of lact who found the defendant guilty of aggravated murder also
find the aggravating factors beyond a reasonable doubt during the penalty phase); see,
e.g., Gregg, 428 U.S. at 195 (stating that the concerns which caused the Court to
outlaw existing death penalty statutes in Furmnan were best satisfied by a bifurcated
trial). For a definition and explanation of bilurcated trials, see infra note 74.
13. See infra Part II.
14. See Liptak, supra note 1.
15. Frank Hinchey, Judge Reverses No-Death Ruling, Columbus Dispatch, Aug.
24, 2002, at Al [hereinafter Hinchey, Judge ReversesJ.
16. See generally Death Penalty Declined, Columbus Dispatch, Aug. 15, 2002, at
A14 (editorial arguing for a death sentence should McKnight be found guilty); Due
Process, Not the Due Bill, Plain Dealer (Cleveland), Aug. 19, 2002, at B6; Frank
Hinchey, Vinton County Residents Say Cost Shouldn't Affect Trial, Columbus
Dispatch, Aug. 22, 2002, at Cl; Stephanie Simon, Town Weighs Price to Pay for
Justice, L.A. Times, Aug. 21, 2002, at A8; cf Randy Ludlow, Considering the Price of
Justice, Columbus Dispatch, Aug. 10, 2002, at C1 (citing victim Emily Murray's
family's remorse and anger at Judge Simmons' ruling, but also citing Public
Defenders' praise for Simmons' courage in protecting McKnight's due process rights).
17. See Hinchey, Judge Reverses, supra note 15 (stating that Judge Simmons
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Simmons stated that his concerns regarding McKnight's denial of due
process had been only hypothetical and not actual." Judge Simmons'
hypothetical concerns, however, became a reality.
McKnight's double homicide trial took only two and a half weeks."9
The prosecution called thirty to forty witnesses while the defense
called only one, whose testimony was easily impeached on cross-
examination."' Judge Simmons offered more time and money to the
defense for the penalty phase, but McKnight's court-appointed
attorneys declined.2 Incongruously, during the pre-trial phase the
defense was denied a $4,250 telephone poll to determine if an
unbiased jury could be found in the wake of intense publicity
following Judge Simmons' controversial ruling.2 2 This concern was
not unfounded. One local citizen, and thereby a member of the
potential jury pool, stated she would "stand on the street corner and
collect coins if she had to" in order to pay for McKnight's capital
trial.23 During deliberations, the jury heard a man drive by yelling
"[h]ang that n---!"'24 Statements like these suggest that the unusually
large amount of publicity and the egregious nature of the crime
incensed the community. Thus, the defense's fear that an objective
jury would be hard to come by in such a small town so personally
affected by the trial does not seem unfounded.
The all-white jury deliberated only forty minutes in the penalty
phase before recommending death for the twenty-four year-old
McKnight. On October 25, 2002, Judge Simmons sentenced Gregory
B. McKnight to death despite pleas from victim Emily Murray's
family that McKnight's life be spared.26 His case is now on automatic
appeal to the Ohio Court of Appeals.
27
reversed himself only nine minutes after the prosecution's appeal was dismissed).
18. Ohio Town to Host Death Penalty Trial, L.A. Times, Aug. 24, 2002, at All.
The actual opinion in the case of State v. McKnight is currently unpublished.
19. Michael Sangiacomo, Court Bell Heralds Murder Conviction, Plain Dealer
(Cleveland), Oct. 11,2002, at B1 [hereinafter Sangiacomo, Court Bell].
20. See Frank Hinchey, Jurors Hear Final Witness in Slaying Case, Columbus
Dispatch, Oct. 9, 2002, at Bi (stating the prosecution's forty-plus witnesses were
countered with only one witness for the defense), see also Frank Hinchey, Murder
Trial Now in Hands of Jurors, Columbus Dispatch, Oct. 10, 2002, at C4 (citing the
prosecution's summation of the testimony of forty-one witnesses and one hundred
fifty exhibits submitted to prove McKnight's guilt). But see Sangiacomo, Court Bell,
supra note 19 (stating the prosecution called only thirty witnesses).
21. See Frank Hinchey, Death Penalty Urged for Killer, Columbus Dispatch, Oct.
15. 2002, at Al [hereinafter Hinchey, Death Urged].
22. See Poll Denied in Murder Case, Plain Dealer (Cleveland), Sept. 6, 2002, at
B3.
23. See Sangiacomo, Wings, supra note 4 (internal quotations omitted).
24. Id.
25. See id.; see also Hinchey, Death Urged, supra note 21.
26. Frank Hinchey, McKnight Gets Death Penalty, Columbus Dispatch, Oct. 26,
2002, at Al (quoting victim Emily Murray's sister's letter stating "'I do not believe,
and Emily did not believe, that one murder makes another just or right"'); see also
Michael Sangiacomo, Don't Execute Daughter's Killer, Parents Plead, Plain Dealer
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The McKnight case is indicative of a pervasive problem in the
criminal justice system that legal commentators have yet to fully
address. Judge Simmons effectively pointed out the elephant in the
courtroom. A careful consideration of the impact of budgets and
county finances on prosecutorial charging decisions is long overdue.
Legal scholars who have implied that budgetary restrictions may
impact a prosecutor's decision to seek death generally have based
their studies on the costs of the death penalty and the effect of those
costs on communities." None have fully analyzed the effect of costs
on prosecutorial charging decisions in death penalty cases.29
One of the reasons why legal scholars may have ignored the
budgetary effect on prosecutorial charging decisions in death penalty
cases is that courts have granted prosecutors virtually unchecked
power to decide whom to charge and why, making the point seem
moot.3' Nevertheless, prosecutorial decisions based on something
other than the strength of the case, community values, or
proportionality of punishment, are arbitrary and capricious, and
therefore violate the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments of the
Constitution.3 That arbitrary prosecutorial charging decisions are
unconstitutional is especially apparent when viewed from the tried
and true ideal that "death is different. '32
The death penalty cannot be arbitrarily applied.33 States wishing to
impose the death penalty must show a meaningful distinction between
(Cleveland), Oct. 16, 2002, at Al.
27. See Michael Sangiacomo, Death Penalty for Killer of Ex-Shaker Woman
Kenvon: Student's Parents Opposed Execution, Plain Dealer (Cleveland), Oct. 26,
2002, at Al.
28. See James R. Acker, When the Cheering Stopped: An Overview and Analysis
of New York's Death Penalty Legislation, 17 Pace L. Rev. 41. 178 (1996) (mentioning
in passing that county budgets could have some effect on a prosecutor's decision but
providing no real analysis); Leigh B. Bienen, The Proportionality Review of Capital
Cases by State High Courts After Gregg: Only "The Appearance of Justice"?, 87 J.
Crim. L. & Criminology 130, 273-74 (1996) (discussing proportionality review after
Gregg and identifying per capita income as one of many possible factors in the
number of death penalty prosecutions). But see Katherine Baicker, The Budgetary
Repercussions of Capital Convictions, 8 n.1, available at http://www.nber.org/papers
/w8382 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 8382, 2001) (stating the
unlikelihood that geographical disparities in prosecutorial charging decisions are due
to budgets).
29. See Acker, supra note 28, at 178; Bienen, supra note 28, at 273-74.
30. See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 296-97 (1987). "[T]he policy
considerations behind a prosecutor's traditionally 'wide discretion' suggest the
impropriety of our requiring prosecutors to defend their decisions to seek death
penalties, 'often years after they were made."' Id. at 296 (quoting Imbler v. Pachtman,
424 U.S. 409, 425-26 (1976)); see also infra Part Ill (arguing that, while the Supreme
Court has thus far refused to apply its arbitrary application analysis to prosecutorial
charging decisions, such decisions should not be immune from review).
31. See infra Part Ill.
32. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 188 (1976). Supreme Court jurisprudence has
created a "super due process" for capital cases. See infra Part I.
33. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam).
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those who receive death and those who do not.34 An example of
arbitrary application of the death penalty would be if an impoverished
county does not pursue a capital case because of budgetary
restrictions where another county with more money would pursue
death. As the Ohio prosecutor stated in McKnight's case, there
cannot be two systems of justice in the same state: one for affluent
counties and another for impoverished counties. 35
A difficulty immediately presents itself as there are problems with
extending arbitrary application analysis to pre-trial phases. The
Supreme Court has declined to find arbitrary application of the death
penalty where prosecutorial discretion is involved, absent proof of
specific intent.36 However, a constitutional criterion requiring non-
arbitrary application of the death penalty should not start and stop at
the sentencing phase. There are many factors which affect
prosecutorial charging decisions; the allocation of county funds should
not be a factor when deciding whether a defendant will be subject to
the death penalty.
This Note explores the effect of county budgets on prosecutorial
charging decisions and arbitrary application of the death penalty in
murder cases. This Note seeks to elucidate the constitutional
problems that arise when prosecutors take budgetary considerations
into account in capital charging decisions.
Part I provides a background of Supreme Court death penalty
jurisprudence with an eye toward examining what the Supreme Court
has deemed arbitrary applications of the death penalty. Part L.A
describes the watershed case of modern Supreme Court death penalty
jurisprudence, Furman v. Georgia." Furman was the first Supreme
Court case to declare the death penalty unconstitutional as applied.
Here, the Court laid the template to which all future death penalty
statutes must conform in order to avoid unconstitutional arbitrary
application of law.
Part I.B examines the next highly influential Supreme Court case,
Gregg v. Georgia.3s  Gregg upheld a new breed of death penalty
statutes that conformed to the requirements of Furman. Part I.B also
examines subsequent Supreme Court cases validating state death
penalty statutes that sufficiently protected against arbitrary
application. Finally, Part I.C details cases in which the Court struck
down death penalty statutes that insufficiently guarded against
arbitrary application.39
34. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 189.
35. Simon, supra note 16 (quoting Vinton County prosecutor Timothy Gleeson).
36. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 293-98 (1987).
37. 408 U.S. 238 (1972); see also infra Part I.A.
38. 428 U.S. 153 (1976); see also infra Part I.B.
39. See infra Part I.C.
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Part II.A examines the costs of the death penalty both nationally
and in select states, including California and New York. Part II.B
discusses the economic effect of such costs on localities. Part II.C
provides a simple but unprecedented analysis comparing two
California counties, Ventura and Riverside, with similar homicide
clearance rates, but very different criminal justice budgets. The
analysis and accompanying data table illustrate that budgets affect
prosecutorial charging decisions in death penalty cases.
Part III explains the importance of these cost statistics to county
prosecutors and how they bear on prosecutorial charging decisions.
This Part also argues that county budgetary considerations are not
within the broad power of prosecutorial discretion and constitute
arbitrary application of law under Supreme Court death penalty
jurisprudence. Finally Part III argues that the death penalty is
unconstitutional as applied because states cannot afford to comply
with the strict standards of United States death penalty jurisprudence.
In the alternative, even if the death penalty remains constitutionally
permissable, courts must address the problem of arbitrary application
earlier than the sentencing phase.
I. SUPREME COURT DEATH PENALTY JURISPRUDENCE DICTATES
THAT THE DEATH PENALTY CANNOT BE ARBITRARILY APPLIED
The Supreme Court has reviewed many different versions of state
death penalty statutes. Consistent throughout these cases is the
constitutional requirement that the death penalty not be arbitrarily
applied. If a death penalty statute does not provide meaningful
distinctions between capital and non-capital crimes, then the statute
runs the risk of arbitrary application and is unconstitutional, violating
the Eighth Amendment. This Part discusses important modern
Supreme Court death penalty cases and examines how the Court
reviewed statutes to ensure they sufficiently protected against
arbitrary application.
A. The Fall of Capital Punishment Under Furman v. Georgia
In 1972, the Supreme Court decided the landmark case of Furman
v. Georgia." There, the Court reviewed the Georgia and Texas death
penalty statutes to determine if they constituted cruel and unusual
punishment under the Eighth Amendment.4' The statutes
enumerated many capital crimes but provided no further guidance to
the sentencing authority in deciding whether to impose the death
penalty. In a per curiam opinion, the Court held that the statutes
40. 408 U.S. at 238.
41. 1d. at 239; see also U.S..Const. amend. VIII.
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allowing full discretion to the judge and jury to determine whether to
apply the death penalty were unconstitutional. 2
All three defendants in Furman were African-American men; two
were sentenced to death for rape, one for murder.43  The first
defendant, Jackson, an escaped convict, was convicted and sentenced
to death for raping a white woman during a botched robbery attempt
when he was twenty-one years old. 4 The second defendant, Furman,
was a twenty-six year-old with a sixth-grade education when he was
convicted of murder and sentenced to death.45 He shot a homeowner
behind a closed door who had discovered Furman's illegal entry.4
Furman claimed he had tripped, causing the gun to fire.47 He was
committed to a psychiatric hospital pending trial and a unanimous
staff deemed him incompetent to stand trial.45 Just before trial,
however, despite an unchanged diagnosis, the superintendent of the
hospital went against the unanimous staff diagnosis and concluded
that Furman could be tried, stating that Furman was "not psychotic at
present, [knew] right from wrong and [was] able to cooperate with his
counsel in preparing his defense."49 Thanks to Furman's sudden onset
of sanity, he was allowed to stand trial. The third defendant, Branch,
was convicted and sentenced to death for raping an elderly white
woman in her home and demanding money."' In a previous conviction
for theft, Branch was found to be borderline mentally retarded with
an I.Q. well below that of the average inmate in Texas."
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to answer the question,
"[d]oes the imposition and carrying out of the death penalty in [these
cases] constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments?"52 In determining that the
Texas and Georgia statutes constituted cruel and unusual punishment,
Justice Douglas's concurring opinion ran through a litany of historical
facts evidencing that the framers intended the cruel and unusual
clause of the Eighth Amendment to prevent arbitrary application of
harsh penalties.53  Douglas stated that the constitutional
42. Furman, 408 U.S. at 240. Justices Brennan and Marshall stated the death
penalty was unconstitutional per se. Justices Douglas, Stewart, and White found the
death penalty was unconstitutional as applied in these statutes. Chief Justice Burger,
and Justices Blackmun, Powell, and Rehnquist dissented. For a summary of their
dissenting opinions, see infra note 69.
43. Id. at 252-53.
44. Id. at 252.
45. Id.
46. See Daniel Gilvelber, The New Law of Murder, 69 Ind. L.J. 375,403-04 (1994).
47. See id. at 404.
48. Furman, 408 U.S. at 252-53.
49. Id. at 253 (emphasis added) (internal quotations omitted).
50. Id.
51. 1d.
52. Id. at 239.
53. Id. at 242-44. "There is evidence that ... the English Bill of Rights of 1689,
2741
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"unusualness" of a penalty determined whether the penalty
constitutes arbitrary application.54 He equated the meaning of "cruel
and unusual" with a mandate to legislatures and judges to ensure non-
arbitrary application of criminal sanctions." Douglas, as did most of
the concurring Justices, denounced arbitrary application of the death
penalty in terms of racial disparity. However, the Justices' opinions
should not be confined to oppose only arbitrary application based on
race. 7 The arbitrary application found in Furman was a result of the
excessive discretion allowed the fact-finder: "Under these laws no
standards govern the selection of the penalty. People live or die,
dependent on the whim of one man or of 12." '5 This statement shows
that, while jurors and prosecutors are allowed judgment calls, the
Constitution requires that those judgments be guided by statute and
law sufficiently to guard against arbitrary application.
Justice Douglas was not alone in his denouncement of arbitrary
application of the death penalty. Justice Brennan also determined
that the primary purpose of the cruel and unusual punishment clause
was to deter arbitrary application of penal laws.59 Brennan proposed a
four-part test for concluding that a punishment is cruel and unusual.
The second part of the test stated that if a punishment is likely to be
inflicted arbitrarily, then it may be unconstitutional."' In fact,
from which the language of the Eighth Amendment was taken, was concerned
primarily with selective or irregular application of harsh penalties and that its aim was
to forbid arbitrary and discriminatory penalties of a severe nature." Id. at 242
(emphasis added).
54. Id. at 249. "'A penalty... should be considered 'unusually' imposed if it is
administered arbitrarily or discriminatorily."' Id. at 249 (quoting Arthur J. Goldberg
& Alan M. Dershowitz, Declaring the Death Penalty Unconstitutional, 83 Harv. L.
Rev. 1773, 1790 (1970)). But see id. at 376-79 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (citing the lack
of historical or precedential importance placed on the "unusual" clause of the Eighth
Amendment and, therefore, stating that the clause should not be used to declare the
death penalty unconstitutional).
55. Id. at 256. "The high service rendered by the 'cruel and unusual' punishment
clause of the Eighth Amendment is to require legislatures to write penal laws that are
evenhanded, nonselective, and nonarbitrary, and to require judges to see to it that
general laws are not applied sparsely, selectively, and spottily . I..." ld.
56. See id. at 250 n.15 ("something more than chance has operated over the years
to produce this racial difference") (citing a Pennsylvania study of death row inmates);
see id. at 364 (Marshall, J., concurring). But see id. at 310 (Stewart, J., concurring)
("But racial discrimination has not been proved, and I put it to one side." (footnote
omitted)).
57. See infra Part Ill (arguing that the Court's arbitrary application analysis
should not be confined to post-sentence review).
58. Furman, 408 U.S. at 253 (Douglas, J., concurring).
59. Id. at 277 (Brennan, J., concurring) ("The more significant function of the
Clause, therefore, is to protect against the danger of... arbitrary infliction [of
extremely severe punishments].").
60. Id. at 282 (Brennan, J., concurring).
The test, then, will ordinarily be a cumulative one: If a punishment is
unusually severe, if there is a strong probability that it is inflicted arbitrarily, if
it is substantially rejected by contemporary society, and if there is no reason
2003] DEATH PENALTY AND COUNTY BUDGETS
Brennan claimed that arbitrary application of the death penalty
"smacks of little more than a lottery system."'" This is a troubling
statement to be associated with our criminal justice system.
The three remaining concurring opinions also derided the arbitrary
application of the death penalty.62 In each of their opinions, Justices
Stewart, White and Marshall stated that they would not tolerate
statutes allowing for arbitrary application of the death penalty.
Justice Stewart, while he did not find the death penalty
unconstitutional per se, also would not tolerate its arbitrary
application.63 In his concurring opinion, Stewart stated that the
Constitution would not "tolerate the infliction of a sentence of death
under legal systems that permit this unique penalty to be so wantonly
and so freakishly imposed."' Justice White found that "there is no
meaningful basis for distinguishing the few cases in which [the death
penalty] is imposed from the many cases in which it is not," thus
indicating impermissibly arbitrary application.65  Finally, Justice
Marshall examined the history of capital punishment and found the
death penalty to be excessive and morally unacceptable.66 Marshall
colorfully illustrated his findings by stating that the death penalty
creates "society's sacrificial lamb."67  He stated that capital
punishment is imposed discriminatorily against "the poor, the
illiterate, the underprivileged," and minorities.6" The Justices
reasoned that discriminatory factors do not result in a reasoned
application of law but rather an arbitrary application.
Thus, all five Justices, while not agreeing that the death penalty is
unconstitutional per se, did agree that if arbitrarily applied, capital
punishment violated the Eighth Amendment.69 Because they did not
to believe that it serves any penal purpose more effectively than some less
severe punishment, then the continued infliction of that punishment violates
the command of the Clause ....
Id. (Brennan, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
61. Id. at 293 (Brennan, J., concurring).
62. See generally id. at 306-74.
63. Id. at 310 (Stewart, J., concurring).
64. Id. (Stewart, J., concurring).
65. Id. at 313 (White, J., concurring).
66. See generally id. at 314-74 (Marshall, J., concurring).
67. Id. at 364 (Marshall, J., concurring).
68. Id. (Marshall, J., concurring).
69. The dissenting opinions in this case are also of academic interest. Chief
Justice Burger primarily dissented because the Court was overstepping its
constitutional bounds: "[i]f we were possessed of legislative power, I would either
join with Mr. Justice Brennan and Mr. Justice Marshall [striking the death penalty as
unconstitutional per se] or, at the very least, restrict the use of capital punishment to a
small category of the most heinous crimes." Id. at 375 (Burger, J., dissenting). Burger
also stated that even if the Court were needed in the instant case because the
legislature had abdicated its role as the monitor of social morality, there was nothing
to indicate that the social mores had swung to the side of abdicating the death
penalty. See id. at 385-86.
Justice Blackmun began his dissent by passionately stating his utter moral
2743
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agree to strike down the death penalty as unconstitutional per se, the
door was left open for states to attempt to enact statutes that protect
against arbitrary application.7 1' Four years after Furman, this new
breed of state death penalty statute was put to the test. In Gregg v.
Georgia, discussed below, the Supreme Court granted its approval to
the first wave of these statutes.
7
'
B. The Return of Capital Punishment: Gregg and Cases Upholding
State Death Penalty Statutes Because They Did Not Result in Arbitrary
Application of Law
At least one member of Furman Court believed that he had ended
the death penalty debate.7" Instead, it seemed Furman had only laid
down a template to which future death penalty statutes must conform.
In 1976, four years after Furman, the Court reviewed a revamped
Georgia capital punishment statute in Gregg.7s The new statute
instituted bifurcated trials,74  required a finding of statutory
abhorrence for capital punishment. See id. at 405-06 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
Blackmun, however, disagreed with the Court's contention that abolition of capital
punishment reflected changing social mores because the Court had affirmed death
penalty convictions not long ago. Id. at 410 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). The
-suddenness" of the Court's determination that society would no longer tolerate
capital punishment primarily concerned Blackmun. Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
Justice Powell simply ran through the litany of prior Supreme Court death
penalty decisions and concluded that Furman fell far afield of these past cases. See
generally id. at 414-65 (Powell, J., dissenting). Powell further claimed that both stare
decisis and separation of powers dictated that the Court not strike the death penalty
statutes as unconstitutional. See id. at 431-33 (Powell, J., dissenting).
Justice Rehnquist wrote a short dissenting opinion calling for judicial self-
restraint and deference to the elected legislature. See id. at 465-70 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
70. See id. at 396-405 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (stating that the death penalty has
not been deemed unconstitutional per se and laying out a roadmap for future
legislative attempts at applying the death penalty which would meet the constitutional
requirements of Furman); see also id. at 415 (Powell, J., dissenting) (pointing out that
only two of the five concurring opinions pronounced the death penalty
unconstitutional per se).
71. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
72. See id. at 231-32 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall's dissent in Gregg
stated that his opinion in Furman reflected his belief that Americans had progressed
morally beyond accepting capital punishment. Marshall said he still believed that if
Americans were informed about capital punishment they would not tolerate it. See
id. at 232-33.
73. Id. at 162-68.
74. Bifurcated trials require the normal guilt phase plus an added sentencing
phase. Usually the same jury that decided the guilt phase will go on to decide
whether the death penalty will be imposed. See, e.g., Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §
2929.03(C)(2)(b)(ii) (Anderson 2003). Often the penalty phase of a trial is longer and
more involved than the guilt phase with defense attorneys presenting a myriad of
mitigating evidence and prosecutors presenting victim impact statements. Like the
guilt phase, the jury must unanimously decide for or against the sentence of death.
Separating the trial into two phases like this is thought to provide more due
process protection to the defendant as he is generally allowed broad discretion in
[Vol. 712744
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aggravators,75 and required immediate appellate review for all capital
cases.7' Gregg, the defendant in this case, was tried under this new
statute.77 He and a friend were picked up by two men while
hitchhiking in Florida. Gregg admitted shooting the men, then
robbing them and stealing their car, but he claimed it was self-defense
because the two men had attacked him with a pipe and a knife. 7' The
jury found Gregg guilty of two counts of murder and two counts of
armed robbery.9 In the penalty phase of the trial, the jury found
beyond a reasonable doubt that two statutory aggravators were
present: the murders were committed while in the commission of the
two armed robbery felonies, and Gregg committed the murders for
pecuniary gain.' Due to the presence of these statutory aggravating
factors, the jury could consider, and did in fact impose, the death
penalty."1 The jury voted to impose the death penalty for the armed
robbery counts as well, but on review, the Supreme Court of Georgia
vacated that sentence because of the rarity of death sentences for
armed robbery. 2 The two death sentences for the murders, however,
withstood the automatic appeal. 3
On appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court, the defendant argued that
the Georgia death penalty statute constituted cruel and unusual
punishment per the Court's decision in Furman.4 The Court found
that the new statutory safeguards reviewed in Gregg sufficiently
protected against arbitrary application of the death penalty." The
Court determined that the direct appellate review was successful in
identifying any intimations of arbitrary application of the death
presenting mitigating evidence and has his fate decided by twelve jurors rather than
one judge. E.g., id. § 2929.03 (D)(1) (requiring the defendant have the burden of
going forward with his or her mitigating evidence). However, in some states, the
prosecution is also allowed more discretion and can offer evidence in the penalty
phase which was excluded during the guilt phase. Id. (identifying evidence the
prosecutor may present to support a finding of aggravating factors).
75. Statutory aggravators are enumerated circumstances of the crime that, if the
finder of fact determines are present, make the defendant death-eligible. Many
standard statutory aggravators cover circumstances like cop-killing, in-prison murder,
murder in the course or in furtherance of an enumerated felony, murder for hire, or
murder as part of a terrorist plot. See, e.g., Cal. Penal Code § 190.2 (West 2002); N.Y.
Penal Law § 125.27 (McKinney 2002).
76. See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 166-68.
77. Id. at 158, 162.
78. Id. at 159-60.
79. Id. at 160.
80. Id. at 161.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 161-62.
83. Id. at 161.
84. See id. at 162.
85. See id. at 190-95. "Where the sentencing authority is required to specify the
factors it relied upon in reaching.its decision, the further safeguard of meaningful
appellate review is available to ensure that death sentences are not imposed
capriciously or in a freakish manner." Id. at 195.
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penalty. 6 The statute required the trial judge to submit a report to
the appellate court to ensure that no arbitrary application occurred."
This report questioned "the quality of the defendant's representation,
whether race played a role in the trial, and, whether.., there was any
doubt about the defendant's guilt or the appropriateness of the
sentence.""8  Here, the Georgia Supreme Court held that the
conviction and death sentence was not a result of arbitrary factors.
The U.S. Supreme Court found that Georgia's mandatory appellate
review process adequately protected against arbitrary application of
the death penalty, especially in light of the vacated armed robbery
death sentences.9'
The majority opinion demonstrates that the Gregg Court remained
concerned with arbitrary application of the death penalty. The
following cases decided after Gregg, demonstrate the Court's
continuing concerns regarding arbitrary application, though most of
these cases have ultimately affirmed the state capital punishment
statutes at issue. In two cases decided the same day as Gregg, the
Court upheld the Texas and Florida death penalty statutes on the
basis that they would not result in arbitrary application of death
sentences.9 Both statutes were substantially similar to the Georgia
statute in that they employed the same statutory due process
safeguards like bifurcated trials, statutory aggravators, and appellate
review. 92
In the first case, Jurek v. Texas, the Court upheld the Texas capital
punishment statute stating: "Texas has provided a means to promote
the evenhanded, rational, and consistent imposition of death
sentences under law. Because this system serves to assure that
86. Id. at 166-67 (citing the Georgia statute requiring appellate review to
determine "[wihether the sentence of death was imposed under the influence of
passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary factor").
87. Id. at 167.
88. Id. at 167-68.
89. Id. at 161.
90. Id. at 205-07. But see id. at 227-31 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan
maintained his conviction that the death penalty offended the letter and spirit of the
Eighth Amendment because the Amendment requires that states not degrade the
dignity of their citizens. Brennan again claimed that the death penalty denied this
basic dignity and, as that offends the Eighth Amendment, the Court was required to
find it unconstitutional. Id. at 229-30.
Unsurprisingly, Justice Marshall also dissented from Gregg. See generally id. at
231-41 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Marshall first claimed that if citizens were more
informed about the death penalty they would not have supported the many new
capital punishment statutes following Furman. Id. at 232 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Further, Marshall stated that even if social mores had not evolved as he hoped in
Furman, the death penalty was still an excessive and unnecessary punishment. Id. at
232-33 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
91. See Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242
(1976).
92. See Jurek, 428 U.S. at 267-68; Proffitt, 428 U.S. at 247-51.
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sentences of death will not be 'wantonly' or 'freakishly' imposed, it
does not violate the Constitution."93 Thus, the Texas statute satisfied
the Furman template and, in the Court's view, sufficiently protected
against arbitrary application of the death penalty. 4
In the second case, Proffitt v. Florida, the Court similarly upheld a
Florida death penalty statute, stating: "The Florida capital-sentencing
procedures thus seek to assure that the death penalty will not be
imposed in an arbitrary or capricious manner. '"" The Florida and
Texas statutes passed constitutional muster because, according to the
Court, they adequately protected against arbitrary application and did
not fall victim to the same inadequacies as the Georgia statute at issue
in Furman.
In a similar analysis, the Court maintained its concern with arbitrary
application while allowing states to experiment with death penalty
statutes, so long as the statutes sufficiently guarded against arbitrary
application. In Pulley v. Harris,9" the Court upheld a California death
penalty statute as sufficiently protecting against arbitrary application
despite its lack of what was previously thought to be a necessary
constitutional safeguard-mandatory appellate proportionality
review.97 Defendant Harris was convicted of a double homicide;
Harris and an accomplice stole a getaway car and took its two
occupants hostage.9" When one of the victims attempted to flee,
Harris shot the remaining man, then pursued and fatally wounded the
fleeing man.99
Harris was sentenced to death and appealed to the Supreme Court,
claiming that the California statute was unconstitutional because it did
not require appellate proportionality review to safeguard against
arbitrary application of the death penalty.""' In finding that
proportionality review was one way to safeguard against arbitrary
application, the Court nonetheless held it was not the only way to do
so.'M' Because the California statute limited the discretion of the
sentencing authority by providing for a finding of statutory
93. Jurek, 428 U.S. at 276.
94. See id.
95. 428 U.S. at 252-53.
96. 465 U.S. 37 (1983).
97. See id. at 42-44. Proportionality review is the term for an appellate review
practice to ensure that the punishment fits the crime and that similarly situated
defendants are receiving similar punishments. Id.
98. Id. at 38 n.1.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 39-40.
101. Id. at 50. "Proportionality review was considered to be an additional safeguard
against arbitrarily imposed death sentences, but we certainly did not hold that
comparative review was constitutionally required." Id. at 50 (referring to previous
Supreme Court death penalty cases including Gregg and Jurek).
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aggravators, the Court found that the statute was constitutionally
permissible." 2
Finally, in one of the Court's more controversial rulings concerning
capital punishment, McCleskey v. Kemp, the Court upheld defendant
McCleskey's death sentence despite an apparent racial disparity in the
Georgia capital sentencing scheme." 3 McCleskey was an African-
American man convicted of killing a white police officer while
McCleskey and three others were robbing a furniture store."
McCleskey was the only one of the four robbers inside the store when
the police officer was fatally wounded.15 At the penalty phase of
McCleskey's trial, the jury found beyond a reasonable doubt that two
aggravating circumstances existed: McCleskey committed the murder
while participating in armed robbery, and McCleskey had killed an
on-duty police officer responding to the store's silent alarm.1""
McCleskey's defense counsel offered no mitigating evidence and
McCleskey was sentenced to death following the jury
recommendation. 107
On appeal, the defendant's argument that Georgia prosecutors
applied the death penalty discriminatorily was based on David
Baldus's complex study suggesting racial disparities in prosecutorial
charging decisions in Georgia."" The Supreme Court found that the
racial disparity was not enough to support a finding that Georgia's
death penalty statute was arbitrarily applied. 9 The Court stated that,
despite Professor Baldus's complex study, the Georgia statute
sufficiently guarded against arbitrary application.'" The Court based
its analysis mainly on the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.' However, the McCleskey Court did briefly analyze
McCleskey's Eighth Amendment arbitrary application claim.' 2 The
Court found that, because the Baldus study proved only racial
disparity but not racial discrimination, the study did not show
arbitrary application of the death penalty.'" The Court refused to
find an unconstitutional risk of racial discrimination based on the
study.'"
102. See id. at 51-54.
103. McClesky v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
104. Id. at 283.
105. Id.
106. 1d. at 284-85.
107. Id. at 285.
108. Id. at 286-91.
109. Id. at 297.
110. See id. at 312-13.
II. See infra notes 318-21 and accompanying text.
112. See McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 301-13.
113. Id. at 308-09.
114. Id. at 309.
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C. Contemporary Supreme Court Cases in Which the Court Has Struck
Down State Statutes That Led to Arbitrary Application of Law
The Court has, in some instances, struck down state capital
punishment statutes because they insufficiently guarded against
arbitrary application of the death penalty. In Godfrey v. Georgia, the
Court overturned a death sentence based on a statutory aggravator
that allowed the jury to find that the murder was "outrageously or
wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman in that it involved torture,
depravity of mind, or an aggravated battery to the victim."' 15 The
defendant in Godfrey had been convicted of killing his estranged wife
and mother-in-law after a prolonged domestic dispute.' 6 His wife had
left him weeks before and refused reconciliation."7 Convinced that
his mother-in-law was behind his wife's refusal, Godfrey went to his
mother-in-law's house and committed what he told the responding
officers was "a hideous crime.""' At trial, the prosecutor told the jury
that no charge of torture or aggravated battery was before them,
therefore the jury found for death based on "depravity of mind,"
evidenced by an "outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible and
inhuman" murder.' '9
The Court found the phrase above to be unconstitutionally vague
because the words did not imply "any inherent restraint on the
arbitrary and capricious infliction of the death sentence."''" Because
this phrase was considered vague and the Georgia Supreme Court had
not narrowed its application in this case, the Court vacated the death
sentence. 2' The United States Supreme Court reiterated the
underlying reasoning of Furman and Gregg-that a state authorizing
capital punishment must do so in a way that protects against arbitrary
application.'22
In striking down a similar statute, the Court, in Maynard v.
Cartwright, declared that Oklahoma's statutory aggravator referring
to "especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel" murders was
unconstitutionally vague and insufficiently protected against arbitrary
application.'23 Defendant Cartwright was a disgruntled ex-employee
of the victim.'24 Cartwright entered the home of Mr. and Mrs. Riddle,
115. Gregg v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 422 (1980) (citation omitted).
116. Id. at 424-25.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 425-26.
119. See id. at 426.
120. Id. at 428.
121. Id. at 433. "There is no principled way to distinguish this case, in which the
death penalty was imposed, from the many cases in which it was not." Id.
122. Id. at 428. "[I]f a State wishes to authorize capital punishment it has a
constitutional responsibility to tailor and apply its law in a manner that avoids the
arbitrary and capricious infliction of the death penalty." Id.
123. Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356, 363-64 (1988).
124. Id. at 358.
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fatally shooting his former employer. 25 Mrs. Riddle survived two
gunshot wounds, two stab wounds, and a slit throat to call the
police. 26 The Supreme Court affirmed the Tenth Circuit's ruling that
the words of the statute did not comply with the Furman template for
avoiding arbitrary application.127  Because the statute did not
sufficiently channel the discretion of the sentencing authority and the
Oklahoma Supreme Court did not narrowly construe the facially
vague statute, the Maynard Court found the statute
unconstitutional. 128
Though the Court has been intensely concerned with arbitrary
application in death penalty cases, the Court has not allowed states to
subvert other constitutional due process requirements in order to
combat arbitrary application. Instead, in Ring v. Arizona, the Court
required that the state not infringe on a defendant's Sixth
Amendment rights while combating arbitrary application. 21 In Ring,
the Court struck down an Arizona statute allowing the trial judge to
act as a fact-finder determining the existence of statutory
aggravators."3" Absent a finding of at least one of these statutory
aggravators, the defendant would not be eligible for death. 3' The
statute required that the judge determine whether any statutory
aggravators existed making the defendant death-eligible.
3 2
Defendant Ring was found guilty of felony murder resulting from
an armored car heist, during which the armored car driver was fatally
shot.'33 Police wiretaps revealed that Ring knew of the heist but did
not show beyond a reasonable doubt that Ring murdered the driver,
planned the robbery, or even that he participated or was present at
the scene.' 4 Thus, the government could not make a case for
participatory murder. 3' The wiretaps and the money police found at
Ring's apartment, however, were enough to secure a felony murder
conviction. 3 '
As per the Arizona statute, Ring would not be eligible for the death
penalty for felony murder unless additional findings were made.
3 7
The Arizona statute required the trial judge to hold a sentencing
hearing to determine if the defendant would be eligible for death. 3 '
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 359-60.
128. Id. at 363-64.
129. Ring v. Arizona, 122 S. Ct. 2428, 2443 (2002).
130. Id.
131. Id. at 2434-35.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 2432-33.
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Under the statute, the judge was the sole determiner of whether facts
existed justifying the imposition of the death penalty.139 In order to
impose the death penalty, the judge must find that at least one
aggravating circumstance is present and that there are no sufficiently
substantial mitigating factors for leniency. 4 "
The Ring Court found that Arizona's statute violated the
defendant's right to a jury trial because the statutory aggravators were
not found beyond a reasonable doubt by a jury of his peers.14' Thus,
the Court actually justified its decision based on Sixth Amendment
jurisprudence . 4  The Court rejected the government's argument that
states should be given more latitude under the Fifth and Sixth
Amendments because the Eighth Amendment limitations against
arbitrary application created in Furman were so strict . 4  Arizona also
argued that judicial determinations of statutory aggravators would
actually avoid arbitrary application, thus serving the Court's Eighth
Amendment jurisprudence requiring "super due process.' 1 44 Instead
of subverting the Sixth Amendment to compensate for the restrictions
of the Eighth Amendment in death penalty cases, the Court stated
that the government would have to find another way to combat
potential arbitrary application of death sentences. 45
Justice Breyer's concurring opinion, however, did use the Eighth
Amendment to justify striking down the Arizona statute. 46 He found
that jury determination of statutory aggravators was the only
permissible way to combat potential arbitrary application. 47  Thus,
though Supreme Court death penalty jurisprudence restricts states'
ability to create statutes, the Court will not subvert defendants' other
139. Id.
140. Id. at 2434-35.
141. See id. at 2443.
142. See id.
143. Id. at 2442.
The notion 'that the Eighth Amendment's restriction on a state legislature's
ability to define capital crimes should be compensated for by permitting
States more leeway under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments in proving an
aggravating fact necessary to a capital sentence ... is without precedent in
our constitutional jurisprudence.'
Id. (quoting Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 539 (2000) (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting)).
144. Id. at 2442.
145. Id. "Arizona suggests that judicial authority over the finding of aggravating
factors 'may .. . be a better way to guarantee against the arbitrary imposition of the
death penalty.' The Sixth Amendment jury trial right, however, does not turn on the
relative rationality, fairness, or efficiency of potential fact-finders." Id. (citation
omitted).
146. Id. at 2446 (Breyer, J., concurring).
147. See id. at 2447-48 (Breyer, J., concurring). "For these reasons, the danger of
unwarranted imposition of the penalty cannot be avoided unless 'the decision to
impose the death penalty is made by a jury rather than by a single governmental
official."' Id. at 2448 (Breyer, J., concurring) (quoting Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S.
447, 469 (1984) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
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constitutional rights to compensate for Eighth Amendment
restrictions.
The cases discussed above show that the Supreme Court has
remained vigilant in attempting to ensure that the death penalty not
be arbitrarily applied. However, as seen in McCleskey v. Kemp, the
Court ignored evidence showing risks, or in fact probabilities, that
prosecutors arbitrarily applied Georgia's death penalty statute based
on the color of the victim's skin.' In fact, the Court has only applied
the Eighth Amendment arbitrary application analysis post-trial, never
to pre-trial prosecutorial charging decisions.' Why the Court has
chosen to limit arbitrary application analysis to post-trial decisions is
unclear. It is clear, however, that the Supreme Court's death penalty
jurisprudence is convoluted and extremely confusing. This confusion
has led to death penalty trials costing exorbitant amounts of money
because of the strict rules of the Court. Counties and local
prosecutors often balk when faced with such costs."")
II. THE HIGH COSTS OF DEATH PENALTY TRIALS AND
GEOGRAPHICAL DISPARITIES IN PROSECUTORIAL CHARGING
DECISIONS
This part demonstrates that capital punishment costs have reached
incredible heights in this country, and that fear of incurring such costs
may improperly affect a prosecutor's charging decision. Part II.A
illustrates the exorbitant costs of implementing capital punishment
both on a national level and in a few key states, California, New York,
Florida, and Texas. By examining several anecdotal accounts, Part
Il.B shows the impact of these costs on local governments and county
services. Part II.C presents a study of Maryland, Nebraska, New
York, and presents original research and analysis of California, all of
which demonstrate a correlation between county budget allocations
and prosecutorial charging decisions in death-eligible homicides.
A. Actual Costs To Try a Death Penalty Case: National Statistics
The costs of death penalty trials are staggering. The statistics below
reflect the incredible amounts of money that states spend on
implementing the death penalty every year. California's death
penalty budget is examined specifically to provide context to the
simple comparative analysis of two California counties presented in
Part II.C. The New York statistics demonstrate that the
implementation of the death penalty is extremely expensive as New
York reinstated the death penalty in 1995. Finally, Florida and Texas
148. See generally McClesky v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
149. Id.
150. See generally infra Part II (discussing the costs of the death penalty and the
effect of those costs on local governments).
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are discussed briefly to provide a national context for the California
and New York data. Another reason for including Florida and Texas
is that both states prosecute a large number of death penalty cases.
1. Costs of Capital Cases Generally
Death penalty cases cost counties exorbitant amounts of money,
and they certainly cost much more than non-death penalty murder
cases.'5 ' Richard Dieter of the Death Penalty Information Center
estimates that the states and the federal government have spent an
extra $500 million nationally on the death penalty since its
reenactment in 1976.5' Dieter based this figure on a Duke University
study of North Carolina's capital cases since 1976.153 The Duke study
found that North Carolina capital cases are at least $2.16 million
dollars more expensive per case than non-capital murder cases where
the defendant was sentenced to life.' 54
Some critics of the high cost of the death penalty mistakenly assume
that the cost is associated with the appeals process. 155 Not so. 56
Because the Supreme Court has decided "death is different, '157 many
additional due process safeguards are in place at the trial level. 58 This
super due process accounts for much of the added costs of the death
151. See generally Justin Brooks & Jeanne Huey Erickson, The Dire Wolf Collects
His Due While the Boys Sit by the Fire: Why Michigan Cannot Afford to Buy Into the
Death Penalty, 13 T.M. Cooley L. Rev. 877 (1996) (arguing that the death penalty
costs too much and should not be adopted in Michigan).
152. Richard C. Dieter, Millions Misspent: What Politicians Don't Say About the
High Costs of the Death Penalty, n.81 and accompanying text (epilogue), Death
Penalty Information Center (1992, revised 1994), available at
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/dpic.r08.html [hereinafter Dieter, Millions Misspent].
153. Id.
154. Philip J. Cook & Donna B. Slawson, The Costs of Processing Murder Cases in
North Carolina, 78 (May 1993), available at http://wwwpps.aas.duke.edu/people/
faculty/cook/comnc.pdf (last visited Mar. 3, 2003) [hereinafter Duke Study].
155. Brooks & Erickson, supra note 151, at 880; see also Dieter, Millions Misspent,
supra note 152, at n.80 and accompanying text (identifying the importance of knowing
that the bulk of capital punishment costs occur pre-sentencing).
156. See Brooks & Erickson, supra note 151, at 885-900 (examining the costs
associated with the death penalty pre-appeal). Brooks and Erickson make a very
important point regarding trial costs: Most trial costs would be avoided completely in
non-death murder cases because many non-capital cases never reach trial. Most are
instead settled by plea agreements. Thus, in many cases, not only is the cost of a
bifurcated trial avoided but also the guilt phase trial costs are also avoided. Id. at 890-
91.
157. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 188 (1976).
158. See supra notes 74-75 and accompanying text (identifying trial safeguards
including bifurcated trials and finding of statutory aggravators); see also Gregg, 428
U.S. at 188. "The Supreme Court has recognized that death is different .... In
Gardner v. Florida the Court noted . .. 'It is of vital importance to the defendant and
to the community that any decision to impose the death sentence be, and appear to
be, based on reason rather than caprice or emotion."' Brooks & Erickson, supra note
151, at 880-81 (citing 430 U.S. 349 (1977)).
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penalty. 159 The Duke study found that the length of each stage of pre-
trial and trial significantly increased in capital cases. 6' In fact,
researchers found that a death penalty trial takes approximately four
times as long as a non-death penalty trial. 6 '
The high costs of capital cases are due to increased investigative
work on both sides, extensive pre-trial motions, and complex trials. 162
In death penalty trials much more than liberty is at stake; therefore,
both sides are willing to pull out all the stops. The voir dire process,
for example, is more intensive because jurors need to be death-
qualified.'63 Potential jurors must answer questions about their
feelings on the death penalty to ensure that they would be able to
sentence the defendant to death if the evidence supported that
determination." 4  Further, most states require two defense
attorneys.'65 Finally, the penalty phase is often longer than the guilt
phase as defense attorneys bring out mitigating circumstances in a
last-ditch effort to save their client's life.'66 The prosecutors also work
hard to convict in such high cost and high profile cases by bringing in
victim impact statements and family testimony.6 ' The hidden costs of
death penalty trials are the opportunity costs to prosecutors' offices. 6
If four prosecutors are needed in a capital case compared to only two
in a non-capital murder case, prosecutorial resources are depleted.'69
The fact that most of the costs are incurred at the trial level shows
that the so-called "endless" appeals process is not the reason for the
extra costs. Also, these death penalty costs must be paid up front by
the taxpayer and are not spread out over time like the costs of life
sentences." As discussed below, the up-front payment of large and
159. Id. at 881. "The [Court's] message was that capital defendants must be
granted additional due process rights and protections beyond those granted to
defendants in non-capital cases." Id.
160. See Duke Study, supra note 154.
16 1. See id.
162. See Dieter, Millions Misspent, supra note 152, at nn.82-83 and accompanying
text.
163. For an example of a death qualification statute, see N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law §
270.16 (Consol. 1996).
164. See id.
165. See Dieter, Millions Misspent, supra note 152, at nn.82-83 and accompanying
text.
166. See, e.g., Ashley Paige Dugger, Victim Impact Evidence in Capital Sentencing:
A History of Incompatibility, 23 Am. J. Crim. L. 375, 385-86 (1996) (identifying the
leeway granted a defendant presenting mitigating evidence).
167. See generally, e.g., id. at 375 (arguing against the use of victim impact
statements).
168. See Legislative Commission's Subcommittee to Study the Death Penalty and
Related DNA Testing Before the Assembly and Senate of Nevada (Apr. 18, 2002)
(statement of Richard C. Dieter), available at http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/
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surprising amounts of money for death penalty trials accounts for the
dramatic economic shock such trials can create in a community. 171
2. Costs of the Death Penalty in California Specifically
California has also fallen victim to the money pit of death penalty
adjudication. A study by reporters from the Sacramento Bee
estimated that in 1988, California spent $90 million dollars per year on
the death penalty beyond the ordinary costs of a murder trial.17 1 Of
that $90 million, $78 million was incurred at the trial level. 73 A more
recent study of Los Angeles County showed that the cost for each
capital trial in Los Angeles was over three times the cost for a non-
capital murder trial. 74 The Joint Legislative Budget Committee of
California stated that abolition of the death penalty would save the
state tens of millions of dollars each year. 75  That most costs are
incurred at these earlier stages, pre-appeal, is significant because
county prosecutors are not responsible for many post-sentencing costs
such as incarceration. 76 Further, these early costs cause the severe
and shocking economic impact on counties, discussed below in Part
II.B. 77 It is because these costs are so severe and affect the county
prosecuting budget directly that the correlation between charging
decisions and county budgets is more likely to be causal rather than
coincidental.
California state prosecutors were criticized for doggedly pursuing
the death penalty in the case of Yosemite murderer Cary Stayner even
though Stayner was already serving life without parole. 7 The mother
of one of Stayner's victims convinced federal prosecutors not to
pursue the death penalty precisely because of the costs involved. She
stated: "It was a waste of money. There are so many things our
country needs-I'm a teacher for crying out loud!' 1 79  The state
prosecutors have assigned twelve people to Stayner's death penalty
171. See infra Part II.B.
172. Stephen Magagnini, Closing Death Row Would Save State $90 Million a Year,
Sacramento Bee, Mar. 28, 1988, at Al.
173. Id.
174. The High Cost of the Death Penalty to Taxpayers, at
www.deathpenalty.org/facts/other/costly.shtml (last visited Mar. 3, 2003) (citing David
Erickson's 1993 master's thesis from the University of California Berkeley Graduate
School of Public Policy). Erickson's study did not incorporate any post-conviction
costs.
175. See Death Penalty Information Center, Costs of the Death Penalty, at
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/costs2.html (citing The Catalyst, Feb. 22, 2000) (last
visited Apr. 15, 2003).
176. See infra note 289 and accompanying text.
177. See infra Part I1.B and note 209 (citing Kathleen Baicker's working paper
regarding the economic impact of death penalty trials on small communities).
178. A.C. Thompson, Is It Worth $3 Million to Kill this Man?, S.F. Bay Guardian,
April 24, 2002, at 18.
179. Id.
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case already. " It was estimated that Stayner's trial alone would cost
$3 million."'
Not only does California spend much more on death penalty trials
than other states, these high-priced death sentences fall prey to the
same problems of judicial error, attorney incompetence, and
prosecutorial misconduct as the sentences obtained in bargain states.
The San Jose Mercury News estimates that for every execution in
California, seven death sentences are overturned on appeal. 2 This
ratio reflects not exoneration of guilt, but rather that most defendants
were guilty but did not meet the requirements for a death sentence
under the statute."3 Further, it is not the California state courts that
are overturning convictions, but rather the federal courts. 4
California's extremely conservative Supreme Court overturns only
10% of death sentences while the federal courts overturn 62% of
those death sentences affirmed by the California Supreme Court.'85
The fact that the California Supreme Court seems to unjustifiably
affirm convictions leading the defendant to resort to federal court
relief has led to California having the most inmates on death row but
only ten executions since the reinstatement of the death penalty in
1978. 16 In fact, two condemned inmates are still sitting on death row
after being sentenced in 1978.117 There are eight condemned men still
on death row following 1979 convictions."'
3. The Cost of the Death Penalty in New York
New York reinstated the death penalty in 1995 amid much political
controversy. Since 1995, the state has spent an incredible amount of
money to implement the death penalty. l 9 This amount does not
reflect a surge in first degree murders. Much of the cost came from
creating the infrastructure for capital punishment: building and
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Howard Mintz, Death Sentence Reversals Cast Doubt on System: Courtroom
Mistakes Put Executions on Hold, San Jose Mercury News, Apr. 13, 2002, at Al.
183. See id.
184. James S. Liebman et al., A Broken System: Error Rates in Capital Cases, 1973-
1995 State Report Card, California 1976-1995, app. A (Jun. 12, 2000), available at
http://www.law.columbia.edu/instructionalservices/liebman/ (last visited Mar. 3, 2003).
185. Mintz, supra note 182.
186. Death Penalty Information Center, Number of Executions by State Since 1976,
at http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/dpicreg.html (last visited Mar. 2, 2003). The
California Department of Corrections puts the number of condemned inmates at six
hundred twenty-two as of April 9, 2003; six hundred eight men and fourteen women.
See California Department of Corrections, Condemned Inmate List Summary (2003),
available at http://www.cdc.state.ca.us/CommunicationsOffice/CapitalPunishment/
PDF/2003-04Summary.pdf (last visited Apr. 15, 2003).
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. See infra notes 191-95 and accompanying text.
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guarding death row and the execution chamber, training a fleet of
prosecutors to handle death penalty cases, and attempting to comply
with complex Supreme Court death penalty jurisprudence.9  The
total cost of reinstating the death penalty could reach up to $238
million before the first execution is carried out.'91 To reinstate the
death penalty, the state spent $1.3 million dollars constructing death
row, and pays $300,000 annually to guard it. 192 In addition, New York
has increased training costs for prosecutors by of $1.2 million annually
and death penalty trials consume a significant portion of prosecutorial
resources. 93 For example, the District Attorney's office in Queens
County approximated that death penalty trials create 300% to 500%
more work for the office than non-capital trials. 94
Much like other states, not only does New York spend an enormous
amount on death penalty trials, but the amount spent fails to garner
the government's desired result because the sentences do not comply
with constitutional requirements. People v. Harris, the only New
York death penalty case to be argued in front of the New York Court
of Appeals since 1995, cost over $3.6 million dollars total for both
defense and prosecution. 95  Daniel Harris was convicted and
sentenced to death for a multiple homicide at a social club in
Brooklyn in 1998.1"' On appeal, the Brooklyn District Attorney's
office enlisted outside help from eight other county prosecutor's
offices. 7 In the summer of 2002, after many hours and dollars spent,
Harris's death sentence was vacated and the New York Court of
Appeals directed the trial court to resentence Harris to life without
the possibility of parole.' 9s Thus, not only has New York spent an
inordinate amount of money to reinstate the death penalty after
twenty-three years of absence, but because constitutional protections
require strict review and super due process, it is money washed down
the drain.
4. The Cost of the Death Penalty in Other Big Death Penalty States:
Florida and Texas Briefly
Much like New York, Florida spends a similarly inflated amount of
money on death penalty cases which are eventually overturned. It
190. Id.
191. Death Penalty Information Center, supra note 175 (citing N.Y. Daily News,
Oct. 19,1999).
192. Id. (citing N.Y. L. J., Apr. 30, 2002).
t93. Id.
194. Id.
195. See id.; see also People v. Harris, 98 N.Y.2d 452 (2002).
196. Harris, 98 N.Y.2d at 473.
197. See Death Penalty Information Center, supra note 175 (citing N.Y. L. J., Apr.
30, 2002).
198. See Harris, 98 N.Y.2d at 497.
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costs Florida $51 million per year to carry out the death penalty.'99
Florida has executed forty-four people since 1976, therefore, each
execution cost approximately $23 million dollars more than it would
have cost to sentence these defendants to life without parole.z1
Texas has far fewer cases overturned on appeal than does Florida,
but similarly spends an incredible amount on the death penalty. In
Texas, death penalty trials cost three times more than the cost of
housing an inmate in the highest security prison for forty years. 1
Texas leads the country in executions, 212 therefore, the legislature's
goal is accomplished through the use of much of the state's overall
budget.
B. The Effect of the Exorbitant Costs Associated with Death Sentences:
Death Penalty Trials Are as Economically Shocking to Local
Governments as Environmental Disasters
The Wall Street Journal ran an article recently identifying the much
overlooked cost of the death penalty.23 The Journal study stated that
such costs are unexpected and can cause as much local economic
damage as a natural disaster.1 4 With natural disasters, however, the
federal government is equipped to bail out the hard-hit counties.2 01 In
death penalty trials, however, there is no federal bail out.206 Capital
trials are not only expensive, they are unexpected.2 7 Most small
counties cannot adequately prepare for the up-front costs presented
by a death penalty charge as the trials are thankfully rare.208
Katherine Baicker similarly concludes that death penalty trials in
small counties can result in economic shock, similar to that shock
which occurs during natural disasters.2 9 Most counties with the death
penalty did not sentence anyone to death from 1983 to 1997.21
Because the counties that infrequently implement the death penalty
199. S.V. Date, The High Price of Killing Killers, Palm Beach Post, Jan. 4, 2000, at
Al.
200. Id.
201. Christy Hoppe, Executions Cost Texas Millions, Dallas Morning News, Mar. 8,
1992, at 1A (stating Texas death penalty trials cost approximately $2.3 million per
trial).
202. See Death Penalty Information Center, supra note 186. Texas has executed
299 people since 1976. The state with the next highest number of executions is
Virginia with 87 as of March 15, 2003.
203. Russell Gold, Counties Struggle with Cost of Prosecuting Death-Penalty Cases,




207. Baicker, supra note 28, at 3. Baicker is the author of a highly anticipated
paper regarding the effect of capital trials on local economies. Her forthcoming paper
has been cited by influential authorities in the field of death penalty research.
208. See id.
209. Id.; see also Gold, supra note 203.
210. Baicker, supra note 28, at 3.
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are generally small and poor, the costs of capital trials in such
localities are large in comparison to the county budget.211 These costs
are unprecedented in terms of prior budgetary considerations. 12
Baicker's study found that capital trial induced shock decreased
county services and increased taxes.213 Baicker found this shock value
to result in a national average increase in county spending of 1.8% per
capital trial.2 4 Further, counties increased their revenues by 1.6% per
capital trial.2 5 Baicker contends that this data show that capital trials
are mainly financed by increasing revenues.2 6 The main way counties
increase their revenues when faced with a capital trial is to cut police
funds and increase taxes.21 Baicker found these consequences to exist
in both large and small counties.2 8
Anecdotal information regarding the effect of death penalty trials
on county economies suggests repercussions that are even more
disastrous. In New Jersey, for example, the state spent $16 million on
the death penalty in 1991.219 As a consequence, the state could no
longer afford to pay 500 police officers and was forced to lay them off
the same year.221 In Florida, where each execution costs the state
approximately $23 million,2 2' 3000 prisoners were released early
because of a budget crisis.222 Texas spent $183.2 million dollars on the
death penalty over six years.223 Because of this expenditure on capital
trials, Texas cannot afford to house their inmates for the full term of
their sentence.224 Texas inmates only serve on average twenty percent
of their full sentences, instead being released early, causing many
cases of recidivism.225
California counties also fall prey to the same intense economic
impact as evidenced in Florida, New Jersey, and Texas. Though
California's state government provides partial compensation to
counties for capital trials, counties have nevertheless had their share
of hardships because of death penalty trials. In Sierra County, where
officials were forced to slash police budgets to pay for capital trials,
211. See id.
212. See id.
213. See id. at 5-6.
214. Id. at 11.
215. Id.
216. Id. at 12.
217. See id. at 13, 15.
218. Id. at 15.
219. See Dieter, Millions Misspent, supra note 152, at nn.8-9 and accompanying
text.
220. See id.
221. See Date, supra notes 199; text accompanying notes 199-201.
222. See Dieter, Millions Misspent, supra note 152, at n.10 and accompanying text.
223. Id.
224. See id.
225. Id. at nn.14-16 and accompanying text.
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the District Attorney candidly explained the detrimental effect the
death penalty has had on his county:
If we didn't have to pay $500,000 a pop for Sacramento's murders,
I'd have an investigator and the sheriff would have a couple of extra
deputies and we could do some lasting good for Sierra County law
enforcement. The sewage system at the courthouse is failing, a
bridge collapsed, there's no county library, no county park, and we
have volunteer fire and volunteer search and rescue.226
Statements such as this show that counties must set aside real social
welfare considerations in order to pay for capital trials. Because
capital trials are so expensive, counties cannot afford to pay for law
enforcement. Instead of being able to prevent crime with a strong
police force, counties can only afford to attempt to execute a few
criminals.
The case of Charles Ng exemplifies the lengths to which California
county budgets are stretched in order to secure a death penalty
conviction. Ng was wanted for multiple murder in California but
remained in Canadian custody for six years while prosecutors tried to
extradite him.227  Canada resisted releasing Ng because of the
possibility he might be put to death.22s Once Ng was finally
extradited, Orange County's bankruptcy forced the county to ask the
trial judge to move the death penalty trial of Charles Ng to another
county. 229 Ng's defense attorneys also supported a change of venue to
"any other county in California that has the money to pay for an
investigation to help in the accused's defense. '231' Defense attorneys
claimed that Ng was denied a speedy trial because of the
bankruptcy.2 1' The trial was ultimately moved to Calaveras County,
but officials there also claimed the trial would cause bankruptcy.232
The saga continued until the state government agreed to reimburse
Caleveras county for trial costs. 233 All told, the prosecution of Charles
Ng cost Calaveras County $3.2 million dollars before trial and $3
million more was expected to be spent during the trial.3
In a last example of California's plight, an official in Imperial
County went to jail after refusing to pay defense costs for fear of
226. Dieter, Millions Misspent, supra note 152, at n.23 and accompanying text
(quoting District Attorney James Reichle).
227. Id. at n.99 and accompanying text.
228. Id.
229. Delay of Murder Trial is Linked to Orange County Bankruptcy, N.Y. Times,
Jan. 22, 1995, at A23.
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. See Dieter, Millions Misspent, supra note 152, at n.99 and accompanying text.
233. See id.
234. Tom Philp, Only Funds Going Fast in Ng Case, Sacramento Bee, July 19, 1994,
at Al.
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bankrupting the county.2 5 The county took its opposition to paying
defense costs all the way up to the California Supreme Court, costing
the county $500,000 in litigation fees.236 Ultimately, the defendant was
acquitted of all charges at trial and the county was forced to pay all
reasonable defense costs. 23 7
Besides county bankruptcy and loss of police protection, additional
consequences of death penalty costs are apparent in other states.238 In
Louisiana, for example, court appointed defense attorneys have to
wait a year or more before being paid.239 This failure to compensate
defense attorneys creates a fear that "poor people get poor
representation.""24 " Also, in a Washington county, public employee
pay raises were delayed, public nursing positions remained unfilled,
and computer updates were halted because of the anticipated costs of
future death penalty trials.241
Further, economic recession exacerbates these problems. Richard
Dieter, writing during the recession of the early 1990s, persuasively
expressed this same concern.242 In the current tough economic times
there is also a high risk of more cutbacks in public services such as law
enforcement when counties are faced with the overwhelming costs of
death penalty trials.
C. Data Indicate that the County-by-County Variation Between
Prosecutorial Charging Decisions May Result from County
Prosecutors with Larger Budgets Who Are More Likely To Pursue
Death Penalty Charges than Prosecutors in Poorer Counties
Recently, several studies have noted that charging statistics vary
widely based on geographical location. Some scholars have
conjectured that the disparity is due to different prosecutorial
charging standards. A January 2003 study of Maryland's death
penalty is discussed below along with studies of Nebraska, New York,
and a new analysis of two California counties. These studies indicate
a large variation between counties regarding prosecutorial charging
decisions in capital cases.
235. Dieter, Millions Misspent, supra note 152, at n.25 and accompanying text.
236. Id.
237. Id.; Corenevsky v. Superior Court of Imperial County, 682 P.2d 360 (Cal.
1984).
238. See generally Baicker, supra note 28, at 4-6 (discussing increased property
taxes and delayed computer upgrades as consequences of the high costs of the death
penalty).
239. Death Penalty Information Center, supra note 175 (citing The Advocate, Apr.
5, 1999).
240. Id.
241. See id. (citing Associated Press, Apr. 2, 1999).




1. The Maryland Study
In January 2003, state-funded researchers in Maryland released a
study analyzing disparities based on race and geographical location.243
The Maryland study examined the geographical and racial disparity
between death sentences in Maryland to determine at which stage the
disparity arose. 244 This was the fifth investigation into the issues of
race and arbitrariness through geographical disparity authorized by
the State of Maryland.245 The Paternoster Maryland study was the
most comprehensive of the previous studies, examining 1,113
homicides; all of the death eligible homicides in Maryland since
1978.246 The study focused on "four critical decision points" in
prosecutors' charging decisions:24 7  prosecutors' decision not to
withdraw the death notice; 241 prosecutors' decision to pursue the death
penalty through the sentencing phase; and finally, each jury's decision
to invoke the death penalty. 249 The study controlled for such variables
as statutory and non-statutory aggravators, evidence presented for
mitigation and circumstances of the crime.25
In their study of geographical disparity, the researchers found that
in Baltimore County a defendant was significantly more likely to have
a death notice filed against him than in Anne Arundel, Baltimore
City, or Montgomery Counties.25' The researchers indicated that
these disparities could not be explained by differing numbers or types
of homicides in the counties.212  Baltimore County was also more
likely to have a death notice "stick," meaning that the prosecutors
were not likely to withdraw a death notice once it had been filed.253
243. See generally Raymond Paternoster & Robert Brame et al., An Empirical
Analysis of Maryland's Death Sentencing System with Respect to the Influence of Race
and Legal Jurisdiction (2003) (Executive Summary), available at
www.urhome.umd.edu/newsdesk/pdf/exec.pdf (last visited Mar. 3, 2003).
244. Id.
245. Id.
246. See id. at 4.
247. Id. at 5.
248. "Death notice" is a term describing when prosecutors must notify the court
and opposing counsel that the prosecution is considering pursuing the death penalty.
Some states have time limits by which the prosecutor must file a "death notice" in
order to pursue the death penalty. In Maryland, the District Attorney must notify the
defense within thirty days of trial. Id. at 6. In New York, prosecutors must file within
120 days of the arraignment following first degree murder indictment. N.Y. Crim.
Proc. Law § 250.40 (McKinney 2002).
249. See Paternoster & Brame, et al., supra note 243, at 5.
250. Id. at 11-12.
251. Id. at 23-25.
252. Id. at 24.
253. Id. The same disparity did not exist for the state attorney's office. Id.
Between those cases where death had already been charged, the state attorney's
decisions to make the death penalty "stick" did not vary by county. Id. The state
attorney has a separate budget and would not be subject to the same monetary
influences of localized economic shock as county prosecutors.
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Baltimore County juries were also significantly more likely to actually
impose a death sentence.2 4 The authors stated that the jury sentences
in Baltimore County were an effect, not of a vindictive constituency,
but rather reflected the prosecutors' initial charging decisions and
decision to make the death notice stick.255 The authors concluded that
the geographic location of the crime plays a significant role in whether
the defendant will be subject to the death penalty.256 Further, the
authors stated that the disparate treatment due to locale goes
uncorrected throughout the later phases of the criminal justice
system. In the summation, the authors emphasized the importance
of jurisdiction in determining which cases are deemed death eligible:
One of the most impressive findings from this research is the
power that state's attorneys have and exercise in determining
whether or not to process a death eligible homicide as a capital
crime. The variation in the treatment of cases across the different
legal jurisdictions was substantial and robust. In the Maryland death
penalty system, the jurisdiction where the crime occurs and legal
prosecution begins is clearly one of the most important factors, and
cannot be ignored,258
Thus, the researchers found that the county in which a murder is
committed significantly affects the likelihood that a prosecutor will
pursue the death penalty against a defendant.259
2. Professor Baldus's Study of Nebraska
David Baldus, the author of the famous study that fueled the
defendant's argument in McCleskey v. Kemp,261 recently released a
study of capital cases in Nebraska. 2 '1 Though Baldus found that in
Nebraska the death penalty was generally limited to the most culpable
defendants, he also discovered that the consistency of sentencing was
due to judicial discretion and not prosecutorial charging decisions.262
Baldus stated that death-eligible cases in urban counties in Nebraska
were twice as likely to be pursued through the penalty phase as those
in rural areas.211 The Baldus study, much like the Maryland study,
254. Id.
255. Id.
256. Id. at 25.
257. Id. at 26.
258. Id. at 31.
259. Id.
260. 481 U.S. 279 (1987). For more information about McCleskey, see supra text
accompanying notes 103-15.
261. See David C. Baldus et al., The Disposition of Nebraska Capital and Non-
Capital Homicide Cases (1973-1999); A Legal and Empirical Analysis: Executive
Summary, Nebraska Crime Commission (July 25, 2001), available at
www.nol.org/home/crimecom/homicide/homicide.htm (last visited Mar. 3, 2003).
262. Id. at 17.
263. Id. at 18.
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controlled for many variables including defendant culpability,
finances, and prosecutorial experience.264 Unlike the Maryland study,
however, Baldus found that judicial intervention later in the criminal
justice process eventually corrected the disparities.265
Additionally, Baldus found that an "'adverse disparate impact' on
racial minorities" resulted from this disparate geographical
treatment. 266 Baldus stated that minorities were at high risk for having
the prosecutor pursue the death penalty.26'7 The racial disparity exists
because minorities in Nebraska primarily reside in large urban areas
and urban prosecutors are more likely to pursue the death penalty.261
In fact, almost ninety percent of minority defendants in death-eligible
cases are prosecuted by urban prosecutors.269 As a result, minorities
statewide face a higher risk of death penalty trials than do similarly
situated white defendants. 210 Due to later judicial intervention,
however, Nebraska as a whole maintains a proportional distribution
of death sentences between white and minority defendants in death-
eligible cases.27'
3. The New York Capital Defender Office Statistical Report
In New York, the Capital Defender Office published a report that
included a brief geographical overview of county-by-county
distribution of cases where the prosecutor considered the death
penalty.2 2 The report is somewhat limited by a lack of analyzable
data because the death penalty has been in effect in New York only
since 1995.23 Therefore, the number of death-eligible cases as well as
death-noticed cases are fortunately few relative to other states.274
Nonetheless, preliminary data show geographical disparity in
prosecutorial charging decisions. Despite accounting for only 19% of
264. Id. at 6-7.
265. Id. at 19-20: see also supra note 257 and accompanying text.
266. See Baldus, supra note 261, at 18.
267. See id. at 18-19.
268. Id. at 19.
269. Id.
270. Id.
271. Id. at 19-20.
272. See generally Capital Punishment in New York State: Statistics From Seven
Years of Representation (1995-2002), Capital Defender Office 6-8 (2002), available at
http://www.nycdo.org/7th-yr-stats.pdf (last visited Mar. 3, 2003) [hereinafter Capital
Punishment in New York State]. The Capital Defender Office is a state agency that
was statutorily constructed under the New York death penalty law when it came into
effect in 1995. The Capital Defender Office's primary purpose is to provide indigent
defense counsel to people who may be subject to the death penalty in New York. See
About CDO, at http://www.iiycdo.org (last visited Mar. 3, 2003).
273. Capital Punishment in New York State, supra note 272, at 1.
274. See id. at 3. Prosecutors have filed death notice in forty-four previous cases
and at the time of the report, were considering thirty-eight cases for the death
penalty. Id. Death-eligible cases have been more frequent, with prosecutors formally
investigating 730 cases. Id.
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homicides, counties in upstate New York are responsible for 61% of
capital prosecutions.275 Capital sentences are also disproportionately
distributed, with three of the seven men sentenced to death since 1995
convicted in Suffolk County.27 ' A study much like the Baldus and
Maryland studies would be necessary to determine if the geographical
disparity in New York State exists as a material factor in charging
decisions when controlling for other variables.
4. California: Raw Data Gathered from Riverside and Ventura
Counties Indicate a Correlation Between County Budgets and Death
Penalty Sentences
The research presented in this part regarding California's
geographical distribution of death sentences uncovered a possible
explanation for the disparities evidenced by the studies above.277 This
part presents an original examination of two California counties with
similar homicide clearance rates27' but extremely different death
penalty sentencing histories. This admittedly simple statistical
analysis is still of academic interest because it demonstrates a
correlation between prosecutorial budgets and death penalty
sentences. Table 1 shows that Riverside County, which has a
significantly higher budget for criminal prosecution and defense, was
also the county with a significantly higher number of death sentences.
The average homicide clearance rate in Ventura County was 61.83,
while the average in Riverside County was 62.8. The two counties are
also close geographically, though Riverside is much larger, located in
southern California in the area surrounding Los Angeles. 279 While
Table 1 does not account for the variables controlled for in the Baldus
and Maryland studies (such as aggravating factors) it does illustrate a
correlation between the amount of money a prosecutor's office is able
to spend on expensive capital cases and the number of death
sentences received in each county.
275. Id. at 5.
276. Id. Since the CDO report, a seventh man has been sentenced to death in New
York. John Taylor was convicted in Queens County in the Fall of 2002. Sarah
Kershaw & Marc Santora, Jury Sentences Wendy's Killer To Be Executed, N.Y. Times,
Nov. 27, 2002, at Al. Only six men currently reside on New York's death row,
however, as Daniel Harris's death sentence was vacated and replaced with life
without parole in July of 2002. See supra text accompanying note 198. Harris was
convicted in Kings County. People v. Harris, 98 N.Y.2d 452 (2002).
277. For all of the following data in Part II.C.4, see Table 1: Riverside and Ventura
Counties: A Side-by-Side Comparison of Budgets and Death Sentences, infra
[hereinafter Table 1].
278. The California Crime Index Homicide Clearance Rate computes how many
homicides were cleared off police dockets per 100,000 population.
279. California Co. Map, U.S. Census, at www.censusfinder.com/mapca.htm.
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TABLE 1: RIVERSIDE AND VENTURA COUNTIES: A SIDE-BY-SIDE
COMPARISON OF BUDGETS AND DEATH SENTENCES
Year County Number Sentenced Budget'8 (budget Homicide Ratex'
to Death 2 m year begins 6/30) (California Crime Index,
Cleared Crimes)
Riverside County 2 Pro $42.971 69.9
Def $19,767
1995 Total $62,738
Ventura County I Pro $30,753 65.4
Def $ 7,999
Total $38,752
Riverside County 5 Pro $48,615 64.9
Def $20,905
1996 Total $69,520
Ventura County 1 Pro $32,341 48.5
Def $ 9,018
Total $41,359
4 Pro $50,913 64.5
Riverside County Def $22,518
1997 Total $73,431
Ventura County 0 Pro $33,5410 56.0
Def $ 9,1)91
Total $42,631
Riverside County 5 Pro $58,902 67.3
Def $14,232
1998 Total $73,134
Ventura County 2 Pro $35,648 58.3
Def $ 9,013
Total $44,661
Riverside County 8 Pro $66,869 48.3
Def $14,719
1999 Total $81,588
Ventura County I Pro $38,672 57.9
Def $ 9,357
Total $48,029
2(X)0 Riverside County 2 Data not available 58.2
Ventura County 1 Data not available 62.5
25J1 Riverside County 3 Data not available 66.7
Ventura County I Data not available 84.2
Riverside County 29 Pro $268,270 Average 62.8
Def $92,141
TOTAL Total$360.411
Ventura County 5 Pro $170,954 Average 61,83
Def $44,478
_ __Total$215,432
280. See California Department of Justice, Criminal Justice Statistics Center,
Homicide in California (1995-2001) (This is a yearly publication compiling and
analyzing trends in homicide statistics in California). These death sentence statistics
are available online for the years 1997-2001 at http://caag.state.ca.us/cjsc/publications/
homicide/pub.htm. Statistics for earlier years were obtained by directly contacting the
California Department of Justice.
281. See Profile 2001, Criminal Justice Statistics Center, California Department of
Justice Publication, Table 10 (2001), available at hitp://justice.hdcdojnet.state.ca.us/
cjsc-stats/prof01/index.htm (last visited Mar. 3, 2003).
282. See id. at Table 1. Clearance rate statistics were used rather than the homicide
rate because it seems the death sentences for a given year would be more closely
correlated with the number of murders solved per year.
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The most immediately noteworthy statistic is that Riverside County,
with a total budget of over $360,000 for 1995-1999, has sentenced
twenty-nine people to death from 1995-2001. By contrast, Ventura
County, with a total budget of approximately $215,000 for 1995-1999,
has only sentenced five people to death from 1995-2001. Of the years
for which budget information was available, Riverside consistently
outspent Ventura County by at least a third and, at times, Riverside
spent as much as double the amount Ventura spent.
In 1999, Riverside prosecutors enjoyed their largest budget ever
while the county defense attorneys' budget held steady from a funding
cut in 1997. The total budget surpassed Ventura County by almost
half. In this year of prosecutorial wealth, Riverside condemned eight
defendants to Ventura's one. This disparity does not appear to be due
to increased violence as the 1999 year brought Riverside's lowest
homicide clearance rate of only 48.3. Budget data were not available
for 2000 or 2001. If the budget trend continues, however, Riverside
prosecutors are by far more likely to obtain a death sentence than
Ventura prosecutors despite their similar homicide clearance rates.
One reason for this disparity may be the obviously greater and
increasing funding of the Riverside prosecutors as opposed to the
limited funding of Ventura prosecutors. A more in-depth study is
needed to determine if this apparent correlation is only a fluke.
However, the data gathered thus far suggest a very interesting
correlation which may affect the constitutionality of California's death
penalty and should be investigated further.
III. FURMAN'S ARBITRARY APPLICATION ANALYSIS SHOULD BE
EXTENDED TO THE CHARGING AND PRE-TRIAL STAGE
A law which in the overall view reaches that [unconstitutional] result
in practice has no more sanctity than a law which in terms provides
the same. 21
3
If the above data indicate a causal relationship between county
budget allocations and prosecutorial charging decisions, then the
death penalty is being arbitrarily applied. Supreme Court
jurisprudence dictates that meaningful distinctions must be made
between who receives the death penalty and who does not. If county
budgets determine that decision, then meaningful distinctions are
lacking. Meaningful distinctions cannot be made when the application
of the death penalty depends on the budget allocation of the county in
which the murder is committed. Part III.A.1 identifies the key points
of influence in the relationship between death penalty costs and
prosecutorial budgets. Part III.A.2 argues that, because of Supreme
283. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 256 (1972) (per curiam).
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Court death penalty jurisprudence and public policy considerations,
charging decisions cannot be based on county budget considerations
because doing so would constitute arbitrary application of law.
Further, this part describes other abuses of discretion that can occur
because of the prosecutor's broad grant of authority. Part III.B
argues that if county budgetary factors are unconstitutionally
influencing prosecutorial charging decisions, then the Supreme Court
must deal with the situation either by abolishing the death penalty or
by extending its arbitrary application analysis to pre-sentencing stages.
A. Use of Budgetary Funding as a Factor in Charging Decisions
Would Constitute Arbitrary Application of the Death Penalty
Under these laws no standards govern the selection of the penalty.
People live or die, dependent on the whim of one man .... 284
Prosecutors are allowed broad discretion in determining whether to
charge a defendant with a capital crime. However, this broad
discretion is premised on the belief that prosecutors make these
decisions based on the strength of their case and the egregiousness of
the crime. If prosecutors are, in fact, basing their determinations of
whether to charge a capital crime on whether they have enough
money in the coffer, then this charging decision constitutes arbitrary
application of law and should not be shielded under the guise of
prosecutorial discretion.
1. The Importance to Prosecutors of Costs Associated with the Death
Penalty and the Effect the Costs Have on Local Budgets in Regard to
Prosecutorial Charging Decisions in Death Penalty Cases
As described in Part II.A, the cost of maintaining a death penalty
scheme is staggering.' The cost to try a capital case in California has
been estimated to be as much as six times more than a non-capital
murder trial."' It is important to note that many of the increased
costs of death penalty cases are incurred pre-incarceration because it
is not the incarceration costs that concern our county prosecutor."7
Incarceration costs are generally handled at the state level while
prosecution costs are handled by counties.88 Prosecutorial budgets
284. Id. at 253 (Douglas, J., concurring).
285. See supra Part II.A (laying out the costs of the death penalty nationally and in
California, New York, Florida, and Texas specifically).
286. E. Michael McCann, Opposing Capital Punishment: A Prosecutor's
Perspective, 79 Marq. L. Rev. 649, 697 (1996).
287. See Robert L. Misner, Recasting Prosecutorial Discretion, 86 J. Crim. L. &
Criminology 717, 719-20 (1996) (stating that prosecutors do not concern themselves
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are generally not affected by post-conviction costs. 2 89
Many prosecutors readily acknowledge the effect costly death
penalty trials have on their budget and constituency. Manhattan
District Attorney Robert M. Morgenthau stated, before New York
reinstituted the death penalty, that the death penalty would be a
"major impediment to law enforcement, because of the cost, time
spent and diversion of resources. ' '291' Because such costs are apparent
and can have lasting impact on all areas of the community, they
necessarily influence a prosecutor's decision to seek death. 291' The lack
of money and the lasting economic impact of a death penalty trial on
the community can create a real disincentive to pursue a death penalty




In addition, these costs cannot be cut because they are mandated by
the Constitution. The California Supreme Court said as much in
Corenevsky v. People.29 3 In Corenevsky, the court ordered that
ancillary defense fees be paid by the county despite claims that this
would bankrupt the county.294  The court found that reasonably
necessary defense funds were included in an indigent defendant's right
to counsel. 25 Further, the court stated that despite the strain its ruling
would place on poorer counties, "relief cannot be attained through
retreat from established rules designed to implement indigent
defendants' constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel, nor
through methods that intrude on the exclusive power of the judiciary
to determine the due process rights of indigent defendants. ' '29" The
court refused to balance due process rights against monies available in
individual counties. Instead, the court stated that any balancing
would create an equal protection problem by "directly condition[ing]
a defendant's right to ancillary services, and hence effectiveness of
289. See id. (arguing that prosecutors should be made accountable for the "split-
funding" occurring because of state-funded prisons and county-funded prosecutions).
290. Brooks & Erickson, supra note 151, at 903.
291. See id. The aforementioned District Attorney of Sierra County in California
was also aware of the effect of death penalty costs on his county, stating he would be
able to hire more deputies and investigators if he did not have to worry about death
penalty trial costs. See supra note 226 and accompanying text. This again shows that,
like District Attorney Morganthau, many prosecutors recognize the costs to the
community as a whole as a result of the death penalty.
292. See Acker, supra note 28, at 178; see also Statement of Richard Dieter, supra
note 168 (stating that the effect of the intense economic burden on counties created
by death penalty trials can lead to rich counties seeking the death penalty more often
than poorer counties).
293. 682 P.2d 360 (Cal. 1984); see also supra notes 235-38 and accompanying text
(discussing the fallout and subsequent civil litigation ensuing after County officials
defied the Corenevsky court's order that the county pay defense costs because
officials claimed it would bankrupt the county).
294. Corenevsky, 682 P.2d. at 370-71.
295. Id. at 370.
206. Id. at 362.
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counsel, on the fisc of the county in which he is being prosecuted. 29 7
Due process rights reign supreme when compared to county
budgetary constraints and cannot be diminished county-by-county as
that would interfere with a defendant's right to equal protection under
the laws. If defendants in different counties have the same right under
the Equal Protection Clause to defense costs then defendants in
different counties should be treated equally with regard to charging
decisions in capital cases as well. The likelihood of receiving the
death penalty should not depend on budget allocations.
2. County Budget Considerations Are Not Within the Purview of the
Broad Power of Prosecutorial Discretion
a. The Supreme Court's Grant of Broad Prosecutorial Discretion Is
Not Without Limitation: Prosecutors Cannot Take Budgets into
Account in Death Penalty Charging Decisions
Prosecutors are afforded a wide berth in charging decisions. In
modern death penalty jurisprudence, this discretion was first
established in Gregg v. Georgia. In Gregg, Justice White stated in his
concurrence that prosecutors have been given much leeway in their
charging decisions. 298 Instead of assuming that broad prosecutorial
discretion will lead to arbitrary decisions, White stated that the Court
would presume that prosecutors exercise their powers permissibly.299
White defined permissible factors for prosecutorial consideration as
"the strength of their case and the likelihood that a jury would impose
the death penalty if it convicts. [D]efendants will escape the death
penalty through prosecutorial charging decisions only because the
offense is not sufficiently serious; or because the proof is insufficiently
strong."'3 .. This presumption exists "[a]bsent facts to the contrary"
evidencing abuse of discretion. "
The Supreme Court further extended the reach of prosecutorial
charging discretion in McCleskey v. Kemp," 2 the Court's most famous
ruling regarding such discretion and the death penalty. In McCleskey,
the Court denied relief to defendant McCleskey in spite of a complex
multiple regression analysis of death penalty sentences in Georgia
strongly indicating racial bias."" The Baldus study examined two
297. Id. at 367 n.13.




302. 481 U.S. 279 (1987); see also supra Part I.B (discussing another aspect of the
McCleskey decision and the facts of the case).
303. McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 279.
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thousand Georgia murder cases from the 1970s."' That analysis
revealed that "prosecutors sought the death penalty in 70% of the
cases involving black defendants and white victims; 32% of the cases
involving white defendants and white victims; 15% of the cases
involving black defendants and black victims; and 19% of the cases
involving white defendants and black victims."3 5  Thus, this
sophisticated study demonstrated not only that black defendants were
disproportionately more likely to be subject to the death penalty but
also that prosecutors were far more likely to charge a capital crime
when the victim was white.3 6 Despite assuming the validity of the
study's findings, the Court still held that this statistical analysis did not
constitute the "stark" pattern necessary to prove intentional
discrimination in violation of the Constitution.1 7
In McCleskey, the Court distinguished between prosecutorial
discretion in venire-selection cases from discretion in charging
decisions.3 8  In venire-selection, the Court was able to find
discrimination based on less sophisticated and less conclusive
statistics. 3"9 Because charging decisions are ultimately safeguarded by
a jury determination of guilt, however, the Court failed to accord the
same weight to statistical data in the case at hand as was granted in
venire-selection cases.30t In ruling that McCleskey was barred from
claiming that similarly situated defendants were spared the death
penalty, the Court stated that a prosecutor's use of discretion as an act
of mercy would not be considered a constitutional violation. 1
The problem with extending the Court's reasoning in McCleskey to
charging decisions based on county funding is that county funding-
based decisions do not constitute prosecutorial acts of discretionary
leniency. In McCleskey, the Court identified several relevant factors
for a prosecutor to consider when deciding whether or not to pursue
the death penalty.31 2  Never did the Court mention funding as a
permissible factor.313 The Court cited the American Bar Association
304. Id. at 286.
305. Id. at 287.
306. See id.
307. Id. at 291 n.7, 293-99.
308. Id. at 293-95.
309. Id. at 294 (citations omitted).
310. Id. at 294.
311. Id. at 306-07.
312. Id. at 307 n.28.
313. Id. According to the Court:
If sufficient evidence to link a suspect to a crime cannot be found, he will not
be charged. The capability of the responsible law enforcement agency can
vary widely. Also, the strength of the available evidence remains a variable
throughout the criminal justice process and may influence a prosecutor's
decision to offer a plea bargain or to go to trial. Witness availability,
credibility, and memory also influence the results of prosecutions.
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("ABA") Standards for Criminal Justice in describing permissible
factors affecting prosecutorial decisions."' These standards state that
the prosecutor may take into account factors such as the strength of
the evidence, the circumstances of the crime, and community interest
in prosecuting."' However, the ABA standards do not mention
budget allocation as a permissible factor in deciding what to charge." '
Further, statistics showing that county budget disparities affect
charging decisions are not irrelevant to an arbitrary application
inquiry. The Court feared McCleskey's argument could be extended
to disparities in "defendant's facial characteristics, or the physical
attractiveness of the defendant or the victim."3"7  Unlike these
facetious factors, prosecutorial use of county budgetary factors results
in the unconstitutionally capricious and arbitrary application of the
death penalty barred in Furman. Facial characteristics and
attractiveness are immutable characteristics, while county budgets are
controllable, alterable, and ever-changing. If differences in counties'
budgets determine charging decisions and the disparity is not just a
consequence of the jury system, then current death penalty statutes
provide no meaningful distinction between those who are subject to
death and those spared. This arbitrary application is unacceptable
under Furman and should not be analogized to facial characteristics or
physical attractiveness.
The McCleskey Court based its analysis on the Equal Protection
Clause and the jurisprudence which requires the defendant to prove a
"stark" pattern of purposeful discrimination that directly affected the
defendant's individual case."' It is odd that the Court chose to look
primarily at the Equal Protection Clause, as most death penalty cases
primarily involve the Eighth Amendment.3" Death is different, and,
therefore, capital defendants are entitled to super due process
protections to guard against the arbitrary application forbidden by the
Eighth Amendment. Arbitrary application analysis allows a less
conclusive showing of discrimination than the "stark" pattern the
McCleskey Court required in order to find an equal protection
violation. 2  The Eighth Amendment does not require a "stark"
314. Id. at 313 n.37.
315. See Shelby A. Dickerson Moore, Questioning the Autonomy of Prosecutorial
Charging Decisions: Recognizing the Need to Exercise Discretion -Knowing There
Wi/! Be Consequences for Crossing the Line, 60 La. L. Rev. 371,380-81 (2000).
316. Id.
317. McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 317.
318. Id. at 292 (citing Whitus v. Georgia, 385 U.S. 545, 550 (1967), and Wayte v.
United States, 470 U.S. 598, 608 (1985)).
319. See, e.g., supra Part I (analyzing Supreme Court death penalty jurisprudence
since the landmark case of Furman v. Georgia stated that arbitrary application of the
death penalty violated the Eighth Amendment).
320. See supra Part 1.B (discussing the McCleskey decision and the Court's
requirement that claims of discrimination be evidenced by a stark pattern of racial
disparity).
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pattern of arbitrary application or absolute proof of discrimination, as
made clear in Justice Brennan's moving dissent.321 Instead, the Court
has been concerned with the risk of arbitrary application of law under
the Eighth Amendment, not necessarily proof of such, as is seemingly
required under the Equal Protection Clause. 22
Finally, the McCleskey Court stated that public policy reasons for
wide prosecutorial discretion made the Court uncomfortable with
restricting that discretion without a showing of actual discrimination
in the defendant's particular case.323 However, the public policy
reasons for wide prosecutorial discretion have recently come under
heavy attack. Many scholars express trepidation regarding the
unchecked autonomy that prosecutors maintain, especially in charging
decisions.324 Prosecutorial autonomy has led to prosecutorial abuse of
discretion including pursuing cases supported by inadequate evidence,
pandering to politics, and using impermissible factors when making
charging decisions (such as county budgets). Examples of these
prosecutorial abuses are discussed below.
b. A Public Policy Justification for Broad Prosecutorial Discretion Is
Suspect Because Unchecked Discretion Can Result in Flagrant Abuse
There are many ways in which the wide berth of prosecutorial
discretion can be abused, some of which seem more benign than
others. A county prosecutor abuses his discretion when he takes his
budget into consideration when deciding whether to pursue the death
penalty in a homicide case. While this kind of abuse at first blush
seems benign, this Note has endeavored to expose its true
unconstitutional effects on the criminal justice system. A more
obviously insidious abuse of prosecutorial discretion is prosecutorial
misconduct. An exemplar of prosecutorial misconduct is the Rolando
Cruz case. There, prosecutors pursued the death penalty based on
evidence that was shaky at best, causing Cruz to be sentenced to death
twice for a murder he did not commit. 25 Cruz was charged with the
gruesome kidnapping, rape, and murder of a 10-year-old girl in
Illinois. 3 2' The evidence was primarily based on a highly suspect
"vision statement" supposedly provided by Cruz in which he
described a dream to police containing details of the murder that were
not public knowledge. -27  Prosecutors persisted in the case against
Cruz in spite of a detailed and accurate confession by another man,
321. McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 322 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
322. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting). The Court did briefly analyze McCleskey's
Eighth Amendment claim but dismissed it out of hand. See supra Part I.B.
323. Id. at 296-97.
324. See, e.g., Moore, supra note 315, at 374.
325. Id. at 371-73.
326. Id.
327. Id. at 372.
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Brian Dugan, who state troopers believed actually committed the
crime.32 The prosecution did not make the defense aware of Dugan's
confession through any of Cruz's trials.329
At his third death penalty trial, the evidence against Cruz finally
unraveled.33 DNA testing revealed that Dugan had committed the
murder, not Cruz. The witnesses in the case and the officer who
claimed that Cruz had provided a vision statement all recanted. 3 ' A
special prosecutor was appointed, and three prosecutors and four
sheriff's deputies were indicted for conspiracy to commit official
misconduct.3 2 Cruz's case was the first instance of a prosecutor being
criminally charged for actions resulting in a death sentence.333
As aforementioned, criminal prosecutorial misconduct is not the
only threat stemming from broad prosecutorial discretion. More
subtle, and harder to control, problems result from this unchecked
power. The independent prosecutor is thought to humanize the
criminal justice system by iconifying community values.334 This idea of
community values, however, is sometimes interpreted by prosecutors
as a call to pander to politics and public opinion. 35 Prosecutors may
seek the death penalty because of political considerations and
ambition."' Unfortunately, these decisions are subject to neither
review nor discovery.337 Thus, there is a strong need for accountability
in prosecutorial charging decisions:"
328. Id.
329. Id.




334. See Daniel C. Richman, Old Chief v. United States: Stipulating Away
Prosecutorial Accountability?, 83 Va. L. Rev. 939, 959-60 (1997).
335. See id. at 958. This would also go against the ABA Standards for
Prosecutorial Function. See McCann, supra note 286, at 671-72. "in making the
decision to prosecute, the prosecutor should give no weight to the personal or
political advantages or disadvantages which might be involved or to a desire to
enhance his or her record of convictions."' Id. (citing the ABA Standards for Criminal
Justice: Prosecution Function and Defense Function).
336. Moore, supra note 315, at 382; see McCann, supra note 286, at 668 (stating that
external pressures may influence charging decisions but seeking the death penalty
based on "political ambition or community pressure will be extremely difficult, if not
impossible to prove").
337. See Moore, suipra note 315, at 383; see also People v. Keenan, 758 P.2d 1081,
1099 (Cal. 1988) (finding that prosecutorial discretion is broad and death penalty
charging criteria are not subject to discovery absent a showing of invidious
discrimination or caprice). This begs the question, how is such a showing of
discrimination possible if the charging criteria are kept under lock and key'?
338. See Richman, supra note 334, at 963.
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c. Because Neither Supreme Court Jurisprudence nor Public Policy
Would Allow Prosecutors To Consider Budgets in Death Penalty
Charging Decisions, the Court's Arbitrary Application Analysis Should
Be Applied Presentencing
Some prosecutorial discretion is necessary but not as much as the
Court has allowed. Individualized prosecutorial discretion is
necessary to mitigate over-criminalization by the legislature and to
individualize justice generally.33  Nevertheless, prosecutorial
discretion should not include charging decisions based on budget
allocations because this is an arbitrary application of the law. In fact,
even those arguing for broad prosecutorial discretion state that
proposed restrictions are unacceptable because they may make
prosecutors more likely to make decisions based on money.341 If it is
unacceptable to curb prosecutorial discretion with civil penalties
because prosecutors should not think of budgets in charging decisions,
then it is no more acceptable for prosecutors to determine who should
get the death penalty based on budget allocation.
Like the death penalty statute in Ring v. Arizona,34" ' prosecutorial
charging determinations for death eligible defendants based on county
budgetary allocation poses a threat to the Constitution and the
Supreme Court's death penalty jurisprudence. Recall that in Ring, the
Court struck down the Arizona death penalty statute because it
required that the trial judge, not the jury, determine whether facts
existed making the defendant death-eligible.342  It is no more
constitutionally permissible that a county prosecutor arbitrarily
determine a defendant's death eligibility. Unlike many factors that a
prosecutor is allowed to take into account when pursuing death,
budget is not a permissible factor. Budget considerations do not
create a meaningful distinction between those cases in which the
death penalty is imposed and those in which it is not.
Gregg, however, stated that the arbitrary inquiry analysis pertained
only to the sentencing stage. 43 In Gregg, Justice White's concurrence
emphasized that the inquiry would not be extended to charging
decisions absent "facts to the contrary" showing a prosecutor was
making arbitrary charging decisions.344 Those facts are present and
339. See Moore, supra note 315, at 376.
340. See id. at 402 (citing Stuart Taylor, Jr., It's Payback Time, Tex. Law., Nov. 10,
1997, at 23).
341. See supra notes 129-45 and accompanying text.
342. See supra text accompanying notes 129-48.
343. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 189 (1976). "Furman mandates that
where discretion is afforded a sentencing body on a matter so grave as the
determination of whether a human life should be taken or spared, that discretion
must be suitably directed and limited so as to minimize the risk of wholly arbitrary
and capricious action." Id. (emphases added).
344. Id. at 225 (White, J., concurring).
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are evidenced by Judge Simmons' ruling in the Gregory McKnight
case in August 2002,14" as well as county budget and death sentence
statistics.3 4' A more in-depth study of this apparent correlation
between county budgets and the number of death sentences sought is
needed. If such a study were to find this correlation between
prosecutorial charging and county budgets to be causative, Supreme
Court jurisprudence should require that states rectify the county-by-
county arbitrary application of their death penalty statutes. The
Furman rule should be extended to charging decisions, for, in the
eloquent words of Justice Frankfurter, "[w]isdom too often never
comes, and so one ought not to reject it merely because it comes
late. 3 47 Because the Court has never felt it necessary to extend its
arbitrary application analysis to prosecutorial charging decisions does
not mean that the Court should refuse to do so when faced with such
compelling justification.
Both Furman and its progeny under Gregg speak of arbitrary
application of the death penalty in reference to sentencing schemes.
States have complied with the template of Furman but because the
Court has refused to examine any instance of arbitrary application
pre-sentencing, the states' post-Furman statutes are inadequate to
combat arbitrary application. Arbitrary distinctions between which
defendants get life and which are eligible for death still exist though
the arbitrariness has shifted from uninhibited jury discretion during
the sentencing stage to uninhibited pre-trial prosecutorial discretion.
Normally, great deference is given to prosecutors' charging decisions.
That deference, however, is based on a belief that prosecutors are
making their decisions on the strength of their case, the community
morals, and circumstances of the crime. No deference should be
granted to a prosecutor who makes the decision whether or not to
pursue a death penalty based on budget allowance. County budget
considerations are arbitrary factors which should not come into play
in charging decisions.
In Gregg, the Court refused to entertain the idea that impermissible
factors influence prosecutorial charging decisions without supporting
evidence.3 4' The discussion above shows that impermissible factors
345. See supra Introduction (discussing Judge Simmons' controversial ruling that a
Vinton County, Ohio prosecutor could not pursue the death penalty against Gregory
McKnight because the county lacked adequate funds).
346. See supra Part iI.C (detailing several studies showing a correlation between
geography and death sentences including a new study of two California counties
showing a correlation between death sentences and county criminal justice budget
allocations).
347. Ring v. Arizona, 122 S. Ct. 2428, 2446 (2002) (Breyer, J., concurring) (quoting
Henslee v. Union Planters Nat'l Bank & Trust, 335 U.S. 595, 600 (1949) (Frankfurter,
J., dissenting)).
348. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 225 (1976) (White, J., concurring). "Absent
facts to the contrary, it cannot be assumed that prosecutors will be motivated in their
charging decision by factors other than the strength of their case and the likelihood
2776 [Vol. 71
DEATH PENALTYAND COUNTY BUDGETS
do, in fact, influence modern prosecutorial discretion. The discretion
is abused because prosecutors are taking into account more than just
the strength of the case. Charging decisions are now dependent on
the arbitrary factor of county budgetary allocations.
B. Possible Solutions to the Problem of Arbitrary Application of the
Death Penalty Because of Differences in County Budget Allocations
1. Because Prosecutorial Consideration of County Budgets Results in
Arbitrary Application of the Death Penalty, the Death Penalty Must
Be Abolished
The death penalty cannot be arbitrarily applied. Death is different,
and if the death penalty cannot be constitutionally instituted then in
must be abolished. We need not fear that acknowledging the
constitutional implications of the theory that prosecutorial decisions
to pursue the death penalty are made in part based on county budget
funding strikes "at the heart of the ... criminal justice system," as
feared by the McCleskey Court.349 Death is different, and should be
treated as such. The Constitution does not require that every crime
be treated with the same judicial scrutiny. The finality of death and
the penalty's propensity for unequal application has been duly
recognized by the Court.35" For this reason, the Court has imposed
super due process safeguards."' These safeguards not only seek to
combat arbitrary application in fact, but also seek to avoid the risk of
arbitrary application." 2 Because the death penalty is the ultimate
punishment and is very controversial, the Court has recognized that
even the appearance of arbitrary application is unacceptable.353
Thus, if capital charges truly do depend on the budgetary situation
of the county in which the crime is committed, this is an arbitrary
application of law and must be rectified. Moreover, even if there is
only a risk of such problems, the Court has recognized that it is
important that the death penalty seem legitimate in the eyes of the
people because it is the ultimate punishment a state can impose
against its citizens. That Riverside County is able to sentence a
disproportionately greater number of people to death than the
similarly situated but poorer county of Ventura does not create a
perception of legitimacy. When the state takes on the task of ending
citizens' lives, it must do so with the utmost propriety. The principle
that a jury would impose the death penalty if it convicts." Id.
349. See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 297 (1987).
350. See supra Part 1.
351. See generally Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).





that the death penalty cannot be arbitrarily applied via budget-based
prosecutorial charging decisions is not an attack on criminal justice as
a whole, but rather is in line with Supreme Court jurisprudence that
death should be treated differently.
Even if accepting this theory of unconstitutionally arbitrary use of
prosecutorial discretion does implicate the heart of the criminal justice
system, that is no reason to ignore the Eighth Amendment. To date,
103 people have been exonerated while waiting for execution on
death row.354 Incalculable innocent people reside on death row still.
Their precise numbers are incalculable because so many remain
without representation and thus have no opportunity for exoneration.
While they are assured of no execution until they receive
representation on at least one appeal, they wait on death row until a
willing lawyer can be found. Further, only 3% of counties with death
penalty statutes account for 50% of the death sentences 55 This huge
disparity seems to indicate arbitrary application.
The social climate is also turning away from the death penalty
because of these inherent defects. Former Illinois Republican
Governor, George Ryan, declared a moratorium on the death penalty
in 2000, calling for an in-depth study of the death penalty.356 In 2003,
Ryan, in a bold and controversial move, cleared Illinois death row of
its 156 inmates, commuting most of their sentences to life without the
possibility of parole and granting clemency to four men.357 Further,
the Supreme Court recently declared it unconstitutional to execute
someone who is mentally retarded. s Many have come to believe that
because of the inherent defects in capital punishment, the death
penalty is a failed experiment. 359 Abandoning this failed experiment
completely would certainly solve the problem of arbitrary application
of the death penalty.
354. Official Website of the Death Penalty Project, at http://www.deathpenalty.org
(last visited Mar. 5, 2003).
355. Ring v. Arizona, 122 S. Ct. 2428, 2448 (2002) (citing Liebman et al., A Broken
System, Part II: Why There Is So Much Error in Capital Cases, and What Can Be Done
About It, app. B, Table II A (Feb. 11, 2002)).
356. See generally Report of the Governor's Commission on Capital Punishment,
George H. Ryan, Governor of Illinois (Apr. 15, 2002), available at
http://www.idoc.state.il.us/ccp/ccp/reports/commission-report/chapterO1 .pdf (last
visited Mar. 5, 2003).
357. Official Website of the Death Penalty Project, at http://www.deathpenalty.org
(last visited Mar. 3, 2003).
358. Atkins v. Virginia, 122 S. Ct. 2242 (2002).
359. See generally Dieter, Millions Misspent, supra note 152; see also supra notes
356-58 and accompanying text.
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2. In the Alternative to Abolition, Unconstitutionally Arbitrary
Application of the Death Penalty Cannot Be Ignored
The problem of arbitrary application of the death penalty cannot go
unattended. Even if the death penalty, with its seemingly never-
ending parade of constitutional problems, is retained, it cannot
continue to be arbitrarily applied. The probability of a sentence of
death cannot vary from county to county based on budgets. Nor can
budgets be cut to account for this problem. Already, defense
attorneys make very little in death penalty cases and the profession is
so underpaid that few lawyers are willing to make the sacrifice. 6
Further, as seen in the California court system, county budgetary woes
cannot subvert constitutional protections such as the right to
counsel. 6' As discussed in Part 1I, the counties are already cash-
strapped, and the country is in a recession. 62 These problems will
hinder any attempt by counties to achieve non-arbitrary application of
the death penalty.
Few solutions have been proposed to limit arbitrary application of
the death penalty in reference to prosecutorial charging decisions
because, as stated before, legal scholars are just beginning to examine
the Court's arbitrary application analysis in reference to charging
decisions.363  However, one proposed solution is mandatory
proportionality review including all capital crimes where the death
penalty was not sought.6 4 Another scholar proposed monetary
compensation to unjustifiably prosecuted defendants.6 Certainly,
greater discovery access in the area of prosecutorial charging decisions
would also provide a clearer picture of what, as of now, is a murky and
inaccessible swamp of prosecutorial power:"'
Opponents may argue that this Note condemns the entire criminal
justice system and thus, that arbitrary application based on county
budgets should be accepted as a fundamental flaw in the system.
However, when dealing with the ultimate punishment we cannot
merely accept fundamental constitutional flaws. Arbitrary application
360. See generally Symposium, Indigent Criminal Defense in Texas, 42 S. Tex. L.
Rev. 979, 1088 (2001) (discussing the appalling lack of funds for Texas criminal
defense attorneys in the state with the highest number of executions per year).
361. See generally Corenevsky v. People, 682 P.2d 360 (Cal. 1984).
362. See supra Part II (discussing the economic effects on counties when faced with
expensive and unexpected death penalty trials).
363. See supra text accompanying notes 28-29.
364. See, Moore, supra note 315, at 400 (arguing for direct judicial oversight of
prosecutors).
365. See id. at 401 (arguing further for fines for prosecutorial misconduct).
366. See generally Misner, supra note 287 and accompanying text (proposing a
system to make prosecutors more accountable to the electorate and end the "split
funding" between trial costs paid by counties and incarceration costs paid by the
state); Richman, supra note 334 and accompanying text (arguing for prosecutorial
accountability and openness achieved through the courts).
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via budget-based prosecutorial charging decisions is an imperfection
we cannot live with when dealing with the death penalty. Balancing
interests can be justified in other criminal arenas, but as the Supreme
Court itself has stated, death is different. States that apply the death
penalty arbitrarily are in violation of the Constitution. The death
penalty cannot be "so wantonly and so freakishly imposed" as it is
when county budgets determine prosecutorial charging decisions.367
367. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 310 (1972) (Stewart, J., concurring).
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